THE GREATER
HIPPIAS
A
DIALOGUE
OF
PLATO
CONCERNING
THE BEAUTIFULL

LONDON:
Printed by H. WOODFALL;
And Sold by W. SANDBY in *Fleet-Street*; and by
R. and J. DODSLEY, in *Pall-Mall*.
M DCC LIX.
[Price Four Shillings.]

THE GREATER

HIPPIAS,

A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

THE BEAUTIFULL

TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

PHILIP, EARL OF *CHESTERFIELD*,

KNIGHT of the MOST NOBLE ORDER
of the *GARTER*;

THIS TRANSLATION OF THE

GREATER HIPPIAS of PLATO

Is inſcribed,

With the moſt PROFOUND RESPECT,

by his LORDSHIP'S

moſt obedient

humble Servant

FLOYER SYDENHAM.

THE ARGUMENT.

THIS Dialogue has the Addition of Greater *to its* Name, HIPPIAS, *in contra-diſtinction to Another of the Same Name, which is* ſhorter. *Concerning the* Title *of it, there is not any Diſpute or Diverſity: neither indeed can any be. For, after an Introduction of greater Length than uſual, acquainting us fully with the Character of* Hippias; *at the ſame time artfully leading to the main Subject, and preparatory likewiſe to that high Doctrine, which our Philoſopher aims to inculcate; the* Subject *of the Converſation is opened plainly in this Queſtion, propoſed by* Socrates *to* Hippias,— "*What is The Beautifull?*"—*And the Point is debated ſimply and cloſely, without any of thoſe collateral Diſquiſitions, or Digreſſions by the Way, with the Variety of which our Author makes the greateſt Part of his Writings ſo entertaining. The* Deſign *of this Dialogue is by little and little to unfold the Nature of*

true

true Beauty ; *and gradually to conduct our Minds to the View of that* Being, *who is* Beauty Itſelf ; *and from whoſe* Original Ideas, *all of them* eſſential *to his Nature, is copyed every* Particular Beauty. *This* Plato *does, in the firſt place, by eſtabliſhing* Four *grand* Characteriſtic Marks *of The truly Beautifull: the Firſt of which is* Univerſality ; *all Things, which are fair, deriving their Beauty from it, and according as they more or leſs partake of it, in the ſame Proportion being Beautiful. The Second Characteriſtick is* Supremacy; *The Univerſal Fair ſupporting always the ſame Dignity, and maintaining its Character of Superiority in Beauty, with whatever elſe it be compared, and in whatever Light beheld: ſo that the Beauty of every Thing, any way ſet in Competition with it, is found inferior. A Third Property, eſſentially belonging to the Univerſal Sovereign Beauty, and characteriſing it, is the* Sameneſs *of it in* all Places, *and at* all Times. *And the Fourth Eſſential Property, by which it is denoted, is the* Immutability *of it ; this unrivaled Beauty, to whoſe Preſence there is no Bar, and of whoſe Being there is no Decay, abiding independant of Fancy, or of Faſhion ; nor ever varying, however Things or the Circumſtances of Things may change. But all theſe Marks are pointed out to us in a* Negative *Way of Reaſoning, by ſhewing The Beautifull not to be That, which wants any of theſe Eſſential and Characteriſtic Propertys ; in*

particular,

particular, not to be Corporeal Beauty, *whether* ſimple, *or ſet off with any additional* Ornaments; *nor to be the Aſſemblage of all thoſe* outward Advantages, *which are vulgarly ſuppoſed to conſtitute a Happy Life, and ſeem to the Many above all things Beautiful and Good, the higheſt Objects therefore of Love and of Deſire; ſuch as Riches, Health, Honour, Long Life, and a ſurviving Offspring. The next Step, which the Philoſopher advances in the Diſquiſition of this Supreme Beauty, is to ſettle* Three *farther* Characteriſticks *of it, more deciſive, and more declarative of its Nature. One of theſe is* Truth *or* Reality; *the Eſſence of The truly Beautifull being independant on the Senſes or on Opinion, which preſent us only with* Appearances *of Things. Another Property inherent in the Nature of The Supremely Beautifull is* Power *and* Government; *that is, Power to produce* Good, *and Government for the* Sake *of producing it; Power and Government, productive of* Ill, *not really doing any thing, but tending rather to undo all things. The Diſcernment of this Property in The Sovereign Fair opens a Way to the Diſcovery of Another, that is,* Good *conſidered in its Source and* Fountain: *all the* Good, *which any Being enjoys, naturally* flowing *from this Principle, which* Plato *loves to contemplate moſt under its Character of* Fair *and* Beautiful. *All this he inculcates in a like* Negative *Way, by diſtinguiſhing The truly Beautifull, firſt, from the meer* Appearance *of it*

founded

founded on Opinion; *next, from what in* common Eſtimation *is the* Powerfull; *and laſtly, from the* Profitable, *or probable* Means *of attaining* Good. *Having now explained the Nature of this Univerſal Fair, in its own* Eſſence, *copiouſly and clearly enough to ſet the Mind on thinking What it may be, the Philoſopher proceeds to ſhew, What are the* Effects *of it*; *What* Qualitys *it* communicates *to each Being, which any way* partakes *of it*; *by what* Part *of us, and* how, *thoſe Qualitys are* perceived *and* felt; *and what is the* Conſequence *of our having ſuch a* Perception, *and ſuch a* Senſe. *We find then, that every Thing, whether it be the Object of outward Senſe or of Intellect, having in its ſelf any* Proportion *or* Order, *any Species of* Harmony *or* Beauty, *oweth ſuch Form or Quality to this* all-beauteous Principle: *This Form or Quality is* perceived *only by the* Mind; *which has a Faculty or Power of perceiving it, only becauſe it* partakes *of the* ſame Principle: *And this* Perception *of Harmony, or of Beauty, is always accompanyed by a* Senſe *of* Pleaſure *and* Delight, *in which conſiſt the* Enjoyment *and the* Happineſs *of* Mind. *All this alſo is repreſented to us by* Plato *in the ſame* Negative *Manner, by diſtinguiſhing The Beautifull from the* Pleaſant *in* General, *and by throwing out of the Inquiry all thoſe* Species *of* Pleaſure, *which have nothing to do with* Proportion *or* Order, *nor immediately affect the* Mind *itſelf, as belonging to*

another Genus or Kind of Things. In the laſt place, to prevent a dangerous and common Error concerning the Nature of that Divine Eſſence, The Beautifull, our Philoſopher intimates to us, it can be Nothing which admits of Number, *no* Particular *Being or Beings*; *not even* One, *as diſtinguiſhed from any* Other One; *and conſequently muſt be, in the moſt comprehenſive Senſe,* Univerſal. *From conſidering all theſe Propertys, which are proved by* Plato *to be neceſſary Attributes of The Beautifull, it comes out plainly to be nothing leſs than* UNIVERSAL [1] FORM, INTELLIGENT AND ACTIVE; imparting Form *and* Beauty *to All things, as being itſelf the* Plenitude *of Forms, and therefore* Abſolutely *and* Supremely *Fair and* Beautiful: *energiſing every where and always with equal Efficacy; and leaving no* Chaos *of Things, in* any Place, *or at* any Time, *unformed or in Diſorder: giving* Law *to Infinitude and Wildneſs, and by that Law* governing *the* Univerſe *and every* Part *of it*; *a Law, which muſt be* immutable *and* unvarying, *a Law equally to All thro all Ages, becauſe no other than its own* eternal Eſſence, *conſidered not as* viewing,

[1] By This the *Platoniſts* mean, not Nature's *outward Form*, but ſome *inward Principle* in Nature, to which that outward Form is owing; a Principle, whoſe *eternal Sameneſs* is the Cauſe of that conſtant *Similarity* in *General*, found in the *Forms* of *Nature*, the Individuals of the ſeveral Species, thro every *ſucceſſive Generation*: a Similarity as exact, as if they were caſt in the ſame *Mould*, or ſtamped with the ſame *Original Types*.

ing, *but as* defining *the* Nature *of Things*, diſpoſing *and* ordering *them:* — UNIVERSAL REASON; — *giving* Bound *and* Meaſure *to Things*; *aſſigning them a certain Nature, and enduing them with certain Propertys*; *and being thus the Foundation of all their* Reality, *the Cauſe of all their* Power *and Virtue, and the Origin of all their* Good: — UNIVERSAL MIND; — *communicating, with a* Senſe *or Taſt of* Order *and* Proportion, *of* Harmony *and* Beauty, *Intellectual* Delight *and* Happineſs: *branching out into* Many Minds, *and making them* Partners *of its own pure* Unity, *and all-comprehenſive* Univerſality; *yet ſtill remaining in its Self* intire *and complete, pure and* ſimple. — *In the* Order *we have here deſcribed, and thro the* Proceſs *we have thus diſtinctly, and at the ſame time briefly, attempted to explain, does* Plato *in this Dialogue lead us on to that Point, which he has always principally in View, becauſe true Virtue according to His Doctrine depends on it,* the Knowlege of DEITY. *But ſince, in the Concluſion of this high Inquiry, he ſtrongly aſſerts the* Unity of the Divine Nature, *a Tenet inconſiſtent with the* Popular Religion *at* Athens; *and becauſe in* Governments *merely* Popular, *ſuch as the* Athenian, *it is unſafe to oppoſe Opinions, by the People held* Sacred; *for this reaſon his Manner of Writing, tho always ſuch as to cover his Deſign, and hide it from the Eyes of Any, but of Thoſe, whom a Diſcipline in the Principles*

ciples of his Philoſophy admits into the Secret, is more covert and concealed in this Dialogue than in any Other. Socrates *all the way ſeems only to be* confuting *the ſeveral* falſe Definitions *given of The Beautifull by* Hippias; *and doing it too under the Character of ſome Other,* an Imaginary Perſon. *Beſide this, our Author conceals the Importance of his Meaning ſtill more, by a Vein of* Humour *and* Drollery, *which runs throughout the Dialogue. For the ſame reaſon, his* Style *here is* lower *than uſual, often the* Burleſque; *and his* Metaphors *or Images* remote *from the Subject, and much* below *the Dignity of it. The* Introductory *Part of the Dialogue is of a Piece with the* Principal; *being purely* Ironical; *and ſeeming at firſt Sight as if intended merely to* deride *the* Sophiſts, *and to expoſe their* Love of Gain, *their* Polymathy *or various Knowlege,* of itſelf *uſeleſs to the Prime Purpoſes of Life, and their total Want of that* true Wiſdom, *whoſe Tendency is to make Men* Good *and* Happy. *But tho the* Introduction *has undoubtedly this View, it will appear, on a cloſer Examination, to have a farther and more immediate* Reference *to the* Subject. *For in the firſt place it is there ſhewn, that the ſincere* Study *of* Nature, *and eſpecially of the Governing Principle in Nature,* Mind, *muſt be* Liberal; *becauſe not followed by Riches or Honours, and making no Figure in the Eyes of the World: that the lower Affections are firſt therefore to be kept*

under, and the Heart *ſecured on the Side of* Truth. *In the next place it is inſinuated, that* Right Reaſon *is alone truly* Law, *the juſt* Rule *of Human* Actions, *and the true* Standard *of* Beauty *in* Manners; *and that the* End *of Law is* Public Good: *that* Human Inſtitutions *are to be tryed by theſe Teſts, and owe their* Authority *and* Validity *to their* Correſpondence *with ſuch* Divine Rule, *and to their* Efficacy *for ſuch* Godlike End. *The Prejudices of* Falſe Taſt *in Beauty, ariſing from received Rules* contrary to Reaſon, *from Popular Modes and Cuſtoms* pernicious to the Publick, *being thus removed*; *immediately is introduced the Mention of* Grammar, *of* Arithmetick, Muſick, Geometry *and* Aſtronomy; *Sciences, which open, cultivate, and improve the* Mind; *lay the Fundamental* Rules *of* Order *in every Art, and regulate the* Taſt *of* Beauty; *withdraw the Mind from* Particulars, *and familiariſe it to the Contemplation of Things* General, *the Objects of* Intellect; *Sciences therefore theſe, according to the Doctrine of* Plato *and his Followers, neceſſarily previous and introductory to ſound* Phyſicks *and* Metaphyſicks, *that is, the* General Knowlege *of* Nature, *and of* Mind. *In the laſt Part of the Introduction, to guard againſt Error and deſtroy the Foundation of it, all the Learning of* Mythology *and of* Antiquitys, *by which the* Vulgar Religion *was ſupported, is ſtigmatiſed with the Character of* old Wive's Fables.—*And*

thus

thus much concerning the [2] Subject *and the* Design *of the* GREATER HIPPIAS; *as alſo concerning the* Method *in which that Deſign is carryed on, and the* Conduct *of the Argument throughout the Dialogue.—The* Character *of its Compoſition is ſo perfectly* Dramatic, *that but for the Want of Fable, it might be preſented on the Stage by good Comedians with great Advantage: nay, ſo highly* Pictureſque *is it, in the* Manners *which it imitates, as to be a worthy Subject for the Pencil of any Moral Painter.—The Ancients agree in placing it among the Dialogues, by Them called* Anatreptic; *a Species, anſwering to that, which in our Synopſis we call the* Confuting. *The Compoſition of it has, we confeſs, that Turn given it; and the outward Appearance of it carrys that Air. But we are in Doubt, and ſubmit it to the Judgment of diſcerning Criticks, whether it partakes not rather of the* [3] Embaraſſing *or puzzling Kind. For, in the firſt place, tho every Thing, ſaid by* Hippias, *is confuted by* Socrates; *yet the Falſity of no* Tenet *or* Doctrine, *laid down by that Sophiſt, is here expoſed. He only gives* Random-Anſwers *to the Queſtions propoſed to him, apparently without ever having either thought Himſelf, or heard any Other ſpeaking, upon the Subject. In the next place, tho it appears from the latter Part of the Dialogue, that*

[2] See the Synopſis, Page 17.
[3] See the Synopſis, Page 10.

that there was an Audience round them; yet we may obſerve that Audience compoſed of Perſons, who were of the Intimate Acquaintance *of* Socrates, *intirely in his* own Way of Thinking, *and conſequently in no Danger of being* miſ-led *by the Sophiſt. Laſtly, in the Cloſe of the Converſation, we find the Intention of* Socrates, *in diſputing thus with* Hippias, *repreſented by* Plato *to have been no other, than to exerciſe his own Mind in thinking and diſcourſing upon his Favorite Topick, that of* BEAUTY.

PER-

PERSONS OF THE DIAOGUE,

SOCRATES, HIPPIAS.

SCENE, THE LYCÆUM.

[1] The Scene of this Dialogue is clearly the *Lycæum*, a Structure of aſtoniſhing Grandeur and Beauty, at a ſmall Diſtance from the City, by the Side of the *Ilyſſus*; the largeſt and moſt magnificent of thoſe Three, built at the public Coſt for the Purpoſe of Bathing and the Gymnic Exerciſes. The other Two were within the City, lying convenient for the Uſe of the ordinary Citizens and Men of Buſineſs. But This was the moſt frequented by Men of larger Fortune and more Leiſure; with Many of whom *Socrates* was intimately acquainted. Hither, as we learn from *Plato*'s *Sympoſium*, it was his uſual Cuſtom to reſort, accompanyed by his Friends, and to ſpend here the greateſt Part of the Day. That the *Sophiſts*, whenever they came to *Athens*, frequented the ſame Place, appears from *Iſocrates* in *Orat. Panathen.* as indeed 'tis natural to ſuppoſe; the nobler Part of the Youth being daily there aſſembled: for Theſe were extreamly inquiſitive after Knowlege, and great Admirers of Philoſophy; and the Sophiſts profeſſed the teaching it, and the making, for a certain ſtipulated Sum of Money, any Man a Philoſopher. To carry on this Buſineſs of their Profeſſion, they were continually travelling about, like the Rhapſodiſts, from City to City, (ταχέως πανταχῦ γιγνομένοι, ſays *Iſocrates*,) wherever Philoſophy and Knowlege were in Eſteem; but viſited *Athens* the oftneſt, where above all Places thoſe Ornaments of the Mind were highly valued.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

HIPPIAS, the [1] Fine, and the Wiſe! What a long Time it is, ſince laſt you [2] touched at Athens!

HIPPIAS.

[1] *Hippias* was remarkable for the Finery of his Apparel, as we ſhall ſee farther on. This, ſtriking the Eyes of *Socrates* immediately on meeting him, occaſioned his addreſſing him firſt with This Epithet: As to the Other, here given him, ſee Note 9.

[2] *Socrates* in this Sentence humorouſly makes Uſe of a Sea-Term, to repreſent the Life led by the Sophiſts, as reſembling that of Mariners; who are roving inceſſantly from Port to Port, and never continue long in one Place. But poſſibly there is a farther Meaning; it may be intended to prepare us for obſerving that Inſtability of *Hippias* himſelf, his Notions and Opinions, which is afterwards to appear throughout the Dialogue; an Inſtability, ariſing from his Want of the fixed Principles of Science, the only ſure Foundation of ſettled Opinions. *Horace* on the ſame Subject uſes the ſame Metaphor,

Quo me cunque rapit tempeſtas, deferor hoſpes.
Hor. Epiſt. I. 1. ℣. 15.

To expreſs the full Senſe of which, we have thus paraphraſed it,

My ſteerleſs Veſſel ſails before the Wind;
Till where the Tempeſt drives, ſome Port I find;
Some temporary Harbour; till again
Reſtleſs I venture out into the Main.

HIPPIAS.

[3] 'Tis becauſe I have not had Leiſure, Socrates. For the Eleans, you are to know, whenever they have any Public Affairs to negociate with any of the neighbouring [4] Citys, con-

So likewiſe *M. Antoninus*, in many Places, particularly L. 12. §. 22. At the ſame time, there is a Propriety in this Expreſſion from the Mouth of an *Athenian*, to whom it muſt have been habitual; *Athens* being ſeated near the Sea, the *Athenians* the Principal Merchants, and their State the greateſt Maritime Power then in the World.

[3] *Plato* acquaints us always as ſoon as poſſible with the Character of his Speakers. In this firſt Speech of *Hippias*, the vain and oſtentatious *Sophiſt*, the ſolemn and formal *Orator*, Both appear in a ſtrong Light, and prepare us at once for all which is to follow, agreeable to thoſe Characters.

[4] By Citys here, as almoſt every where elſe in *Plato*, are meant *Civil States*. For *Greece* was divided into many ſuch, all free and independant: and the Capital City of each, being ſtrongly fortified, was the Reſidence of the Chief Magiſtracy, and the Centre of Power: in the Name of This naturally therefore was included the whole dependant Diſtrict. The Citys, particularly meant in this Place, are thoſe of the *Peloponneſus*. For the ſeveral States, which compoſed this Part of *Greece*, were divided either in their Intereſts or Affections between the two Principal and Rival Powers, thoſe of *Athens* and *Sparta*; who in the Time of *Socrates* were engaged in a long War one with the other. Moſt of the leſſer States joined themſelves to the *Spartans*: that of *Argos*, one of the moſt conſiderable, with a few Others, ſupported the *Athenians*: whilſt the *Eleans* not only choſe to continue Neutral, but by their Embaſſadors, ſent to all the States concerned, laboured to reſtore a General Peace. And when they were at length forced into the War, took the firſt Opportunity, given them by a Pretence of Ill Uſage from the Party which they adhered to, the *Lacedæmonian* or *Spartan*, to return to their Neutrality. Thus we ſee, what were the Objects of the Negociations, in which *Hippias* had been engaged; firſt, a Peace between the contending Powers; or if That could not be effected, then,

conſtantly apply to Me, and appoint Me their Ambaſſador for that Purpoſe, in Preference to all Others: becauſe they conſider Me as a Perſon the Ableſt to form a right Judgment of what is argued and alleged by every One of the Citys, and to make a proper Report of it to Them. [5] My Embaſſys therefore have been frequent to Many of thoſe Powers; but oftener, and upon Points the moſt in Number, as well as of the higheſt Importance, have I gone to Sparta to treat with the Lacedæmonians. This is the Reaſon then, in Anſwer to Your Queſtion, why ſo ſeldom I viſit Theſe Parts.

SOCRATES.

This it is, Hippias, to be a Man truly wiſe and perfectly accompliſhed. For, being thus qualified, you have, in your [6] Private Capacity, great Preſents made you by the Young Men

the Maintenance of their own Neutrality. And farther, a Thing more worthy our Curioſity when we are reading *Plato*, this ſhort View of the State of Affairs among the *Grecians*, in that Age, will help us in aſcertaining the Time of the Converſation, here related, between *Socrates* and *Hippias*. But for this Inquiry we refer to our *Diſſertation on the Order of the Dialogues*, where we have endeavoured to ſettle with ſome Degree of Exactneſs the Date of them all.

[5] See *Philoſtrat.* p. 495. Ed. Olear.

[6] *Hippias* is here repreſented, as being both a *Sophiſt* and an *Orator*. For the better apprehending this double Character of his, and the more fully underſtanding thoſe many Paſſages of *Plato*, where theſe Profeſſions are mentioned, it may be uſeful to give a ſummary Account of their Riſe and Nature. The *Grecian* Wiſdom then, or *Philoſophy*, in the moſt ancient Times, of which any Records are left us, included *Phyſicks*,

Men of the Age; and are able to make them ample Amends by the greater Advantages, which They derive from you: then, in your [6] Public Character, you are able to do Service

Phyſicks, *Ethicks*, and *Politicks*, until the Time of *Thales* the *Ionian*; who giving himſelf up wholly to the Study of *Nature*, of her *Principles* and Elements, with the *Cauſes* of the ſeveral Phænomena, became famous above all the ancient Sages for *Natural Knowlege*; and led the Way to a Succeſſion of Philoſophers, from their Founder and firſt Maſter called *Ionic*. Addicted thus to the Contemplation of Things remote from the Affairs of Men, Theſe all lived abſtracted as much as poſſible from Human Society; revealing the Secrets of Nature only to a few ſelect Diſciples, who ſought them out in their Retreat, and had a Genius for the ſame abſtruſe Inquirys, together with a Taſt for the ſame retired Kind of Life. As the Fame of their Wiſdom ſpred, the Curioſity of that whole Inquiſitive Nation, the *Grecians*, was at length excited. This gave Occaſion to the Riſe of a new Profeſſion or Sect, very different from that of thoſe *ſpeculative Sages*. A Set of Men, ſmitten, not with the Love of Wiſdom, but of Fame and Glory, Men of great natural Abilitys, notable Induſtry and Boldneſs, appeared in *Greece*; and aſſuming the Name of *Sophiſts*, a Name hitherto highly honourable, and given only to Thoſe, by whom Mankind in General were ſuppoſed to be made wiſer, to their ancient Poets, Legiſlators, and the Gods themſelves, (ſee our Notes on the *Minos*;) undertook to teach, by a few Leſſons and in a ſhort Time, all the Parts of Philoſophy to any Perſon, of whatever Kind were his Diſpoſition or Turn of Mind, and of whatever Degree the Capacity of it, ſo that he was but able to pay largely for his Teaching. In the ſame Age with *Thales* lived *Solon* the *Athenian*; who took the other Part of Philoſophy to cultivate; and applying himſelf chiefly to *Moral* and *Political* Science, became ſo great a Proficient in thoſe Studies, that he gave a new Syſtem of excellent Laws to his Country. Hence aroſe in *Athens* a Race of *Politicians*, ſtudious of the Laws, and of the Art of *Government*. During this Succeſſion, thro Force of natural Genius, Good Polity, Commerce and Riches among the

Service to your Country; as a Man [7] ought, who would raiſe himſelf above Contempt, and acquire Reputation among

Athenians, great Improvements were made in all the Liberal Arts: but that of *Oratory* flouriſhed above the reſt, for this Reaſon; becauſe the *Athenians* lived under a Popular Government, where the Art of Ruling is only by Perſuaſion. Eloquence then being one of the principal Means of Perſuaſion, and Perſuaſion the only Way to acquire and maintain Power, All, who were ambitious of any Magiſtracy or Office in the Government, ſtudied to become eloquent Orators; and the Arts of Rhetorick and Polity were thus united in the ſame Perſons. Accordingly we learn from the Attic Writers of thoſe Days, that the moſt popular *Orators* at *Athens* were appointed to Embaſſys, to Magiſtracys, to the Command of Armys, and the Supreme Adminiſtration of all Civil Affairs. See particularly *Iſocrates* in *Orat. de Pace, & Panathen.* In this Dialogue we find, that the ſame Spirit prevailed at *Elis*. Now in Men of great Abilitys the predominant Paſſion is Ambition, more frequently than Avarice. Thoſe of the *Sophiſts* therefore, who excelled in Quickneſs of Underſtanding, Compaſs of Knowlege, and Ingenuity, ſuch as *Hippias* was, added to their other Attainments the Arts of *Popular Oratory*, and by that Means got into the Management of the State. Thus much for the preſent: the Sequel and the Supplement of this ſhort Hiſtory, ſo far as they are neceſſary to our Purpoſe, will appear on fit Occaſions.

[7] *Socrates* here unfolds the true Motives on which *Hippias* acted, in his uſual ſly and artful Manner; doing always like *Horace*,

> *Omne vafer vitium ridenti Flaccus amico*
> *Tangit, & admiſſus circum præcordia ludit.*
>
> Perſ. Sat. 1. ℣. 116.
>
> *With Touch ſo fine, ſo tender of his Friend,*
> *He handles every Fault which he would mend,*
> *That the pleas'd Patient with a Smile endures*
> *The playful Hand, which tickles while it cures.*

Equally

among the Multitude. But, Hippias, what ſort of Reaſon can be given, why Thoſe in former Days, who are ſo highly famed for Wiſdom, Pittacus, and Bias, and [8] Thales the Mile-

Equally delicate and polite is the Satyr of *Socrates*; but with this Difference, that the Philoſopher having to do with Sophiſts, whom he knew ſenſeleſs to their Faults and incorrigible, drew the Smile rather from his Audience.

[8] Οἱ ἀμφὶ Θαλῆν. *Ficinus*, *Grynæus*, and *Bembo* take theſe Words to mean Thoſe who lived *in the Time of Thales*, that is, the famous cotemporary *Seven*, upon whom *Greece* had of old beſtowed the Surname of *Wiſe*; of which Number were *Pittacus* and *Bias*. But whoever reads in *Plutarch*, *(Vit. Solon.)* that all Theſe, except *Thales*, acquired that Honour ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, *from their Political Abilitys*; or has learnt from *Plutarch*'s other Treatiſes, and from *Laertius*, that Three of them were *Kings*, One a *Legiſlator*, Another one of the *Ephori* or ſupreme Magiſtrates in *Sparta*, and that a Sixth had a principal Share in the *Public Counſels* of his Country, muſt ſee, that either *Plato* is much miſtaken Himſelf, or his Meaning miſtaken by thoſe Tranſlators. *Cornarius*, *Serranus*, and the Tranſlator of this Dialogue into *French*, Monſ. *Maucroy*, underſtand this Phraſe to ſignify only *Thales*. The modern Lexicographers indeed tell us, that the Words οἱ ἀμφὶ, before the Name of any Perſon, uſually mean that very Perſon only himſelf: which is as much as to ſay, that uſually they are of no Force, and ſignify juſt nothing at all. The common *Scholia* on *Homer* (Iliad. L. 3. ϒ. 146.) ſeem to have firſt occaſioned that Error. But we cannot find, that either there, or any where in the earlieſt and beſt *Greek* Writings, ſuch an Expreſſion is uſed, unleſs to ſignify *Many*, of which the Perſon mentioned is the *Principal*, and the nameleſs reſt, οἱ ἀμφὶ, are either his *Attendants*, *Followers*, *Adherents*, or ſubordinate *Aſſociates*. It may ſuffice to produce One Inſtance from *Plato* himſelf, in his *Protagoras*, pag. 316. where τὺς ἀμφί τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μυσαῖον is rightly tranſlated by *Ficinus* and *Serranus* Both, as meaning not only *Orpheus* and *Muſæus*, but their Diſciples likewiſe and Followers. As to thoſe Seven

Mileſian, with his Diſciples, Succeſſors and Followers, down to Anaxagoras, if not All, yet Moſt of them, are found to have lived the Lives of Private Men, declining to engage in Public Affairs?

HIPPIAS.

What other Reaſon, Socrates, can you imagine beſide This, that they had not a ſufficient Reach of Prudence, for the Conduct of their own Private Affairs, and thoſe of the Public, at the ſame Time?

SOCRATES.

Tell me then in the Name of Jove, whether, as all other Arts are improved, and the Workmen of former Times are contemptible and mean in Compariſon with Ours, ſhall we ſay that Your Art, that of the Sophiſts, hath in like manner received Improvement; and that Such of the Ancients, as applied themſelves to the Study of Wiſdom, were Nothing, compared to [9] You of the Preſent Age?

HIPPIAS.

Seven Sages, we refer to our Notes on the *Protagoras*, where they are enumerated by *Plato*, in a Liſt ſomewhat different from That given us by the Generality of Writers.

[9] The firſt and greateſt of the Sophiſts, thoſe mentioned in this Dialogue, had, before they embarqued in their new Profeſſion, been Diſciples of ſome of the Philoſophers; but with no other View, it ſeems, than ſuch as the Learners of inferior Arts have, to acquire the Means of making their Fortunes. They ſoon forſook therefore the Purſuit of Wiſdom for that of Wealth and Power, and began teaching and diſpenſing their Knowlege to Others, before they had laid in a ſufficient Stock, and without any ſettled Principles as a Fund for a continual Supply. Yet, till *Socrates* had thoroughly expoſed them, they had

HIPPIAS.

Perfectly right: that is the very Caſe.

SOCRATES.

So that were Bias to be reſtored to Life again in Our Days, he would be liable to Ridicule, appearing in Competition with You Sophiſts: Your Caſe being parallel to that of our modern Statuarys, who tell us, that Dædalus, were He alive, and to execute ſuch Works as thoſe, to which he owed his great Name, would but expoſe himſelf, and become ridiculous.

HIPPIAS.

The Truth of the Matter, Socrates, exactly is what you ſay. I my Self, however, make it my Cuſtom to beſtow my Commendations rather upon the Ancients, and upon all Such, as flouriſhed in Times precedent to our own; giving Them

had the Addreſs to be taken for *Wiſe Men* and Great *Philoſophers*. *Hippias*, in particular, was by all the *Grecians* honoured with the Surname of *Wiſe*; as we learn from *Pauſanias*, p. 443. Ed. *Kuhn*. who is rightly underſtood in this Senſe by *Creſollius*, *Theat. Rhet.* p. 36. Accordingly in *Plato*'s *Protagoras* he is called Ἱππίας ὁ σοφὸς, *Hippias the Wiſe*. On this Account it is, that *Socrates*, in his firſt Salute, addreſſes him with that Title; the Ironical Flattery of which would have been too groſs, had not the Ears of *Hippias* been familiariſed to ſuch a Compliment. *Suidas* (in ipsâ voce) calls him a *Philoſopher* as well as *Sophiſt*; and informs us, that he had been the Diſciple of *Hegeſidamus*; concerning whom, and the Philoſophy which he taught, not to repeat needleſsly the ſame Thing twice, we refer to our Notes on the *Leſſer Hippias*.

Them the Pre-eminence and [10] Precedence above our Selves; in order to eſcape the Envy of the Living, and for Fear of incurring the [11] Reſentment of the Dead.

SOCRATES.

[10] Ad-literations, Ad-nominations, and Repetitions of the ſame Word, were ſome of thoſe Prettineſſes of Style, or Graces where they are employed with Judgment, which are ſaid to have been invented by the Rhetorical Sophiſts. *Plato* therefore frequently in his Dialogues, with great Propriety, puts them into the Mouths of Such Speakers. On what Occaſions, and how differently from the Uſe made of them by thoſe Sophiſtical Orators, he introduces them into his own Style at other Times, will be obſerved elſewhere.

[11] There was a Law at *Athens*, the Author of which was *Solon*, ordaining μὴ λέγειν κακῶς τὸν τεθνηκότα, *not to revile the Dead:* a Law made, ſays *Plutarch*, partly from a Political Conſideration, to hinder the perpetuating of Enmitys; partly from a Motive of Juſtice, which forbids the attacking Thoſe, who are not in a Capacity of defending themſelves; and partly from a Principle of Religion, agreeably to which the Departed are to be looked on as Sacred: καὶ ὅσιον τὺς μεθεςῶτας ἱερὺς νομίζειν. *Plut. in Vit. Solon.* p. 89. E. That this Sentiment was of much earlier Antiquity than the Age of *Solon*, appears from the following Paſſage of *Archilochus*, cited by *Clemens Alex.* Strom. L. 6. p. 619. Ed. Sylburg.

Οὐ γὰρ (inſ. f. τάδ') ἐσθλὰ, κατθανὔσι κερτομεῖν
Ἐπ' ἀνδράσι. ——

For this is Evil, with Heart-biting Taunt
To perſecute Men dead. ——

And from this of *Homer* ſtill earlier,

Οὐκ ὅσιον φθιμένοισιν ἐπ' ἀνδράσιν εὐχετάασθαι.

Odyſſ. L. 22. ℣. 412.

With boaſtful Speech to glory o'er the Dead,
Is impious. ——

SOCRATES.

In My Opinion, Hippias, you ſee the Matter in a juſt Light, and conſider it thoroughly well. I my Self can witneſs the Truth of what you ſay. It is indeed certain, that your Art is in This Reſpect really improved, in that you are able to manage the Concerns of the Publick, and at the ſame time give Attention to your own Private Intereſts. [12] For Gorgias, that great Sophiſt of Leontium,

This Piece of ancient Religion aroſe partly from an Opinion, that Souls, freed from their Earthly Bodys, were in a State of Being ſuperiour to that of Mortals, and ought therefore to be honoured by them; and partly was owing to a Belief, that the ſhadowy Ghoſts, or Spirits, (which they diſtinguiſhed from the Intellectual Souls) of dead Perſons had it in their Power to hurt the Living, by haunting and diſturbing them at leaſt, if no other way. 'Tis on the Foundation of this Belief, that *Virgil* repreſents *Dido* thus threatning *Æneas*,

Omnibus umbra locis adero: dabis, improbe, pœnas.
Æneid. L. 4. ℣. 386.
Be where thou wilt, My Shade ſhall ſtill be there:
Yes; thou ſhalt ſuffer for thy Cruelty,
Baſe Man! ——

And hence likewiſe came to be inſtituted the Religious Rite of offering θελκτήρια, Pacificatory Sacrifices, to the Ghoſts of Thoſe, whom they were afraid of having offended. See *Eurip. Iphigen. in Taur.* ℣. 166.

[12] The Character of *Gorgias* is painted by *Plato* at full Length in a Dialogue inſcribed with His Name. 'Twill be ſufficient for our preſent Purpoſe to obſerve, that *Gorgias* was by Profeſſion, like *Hippias*, an *Orator*, as well as *Sophiſt*; and ſet up for teaching both *Philoſophy* and the

ontium, came hither on a Public Embaſſy from his Country, as the Ableſt Man among the Leontines to negociate their Affairs of State: and here he acquired Glory by his fine Harangues in the Aſſembly of the People; at the ſame time that by his [13] Exhibitions before Private Companys, and

Art of *Rhetorick*: and that the Price of his Teaching was 100 Μναῖ, which is of our Money 322*l.* 18*s.* 4*d.* from each of his Scholars.

[13] The Profeſſion or Buſineſs of a *Sophiſt* conſiſted of *Three Branches*: One of which was to perfect and accompliſh the Fine Gentleman, according to the Idea which the *Grecians* had of ſuch a Character in that Age of Sophiſm: not to form him from the firſt Rudiments throughout, or in any Part; for This Taſk they thought beneath them: but after a Courſe of Liberal Education had been gone thro, and the Studys and Exerciſes of Youth were ended, to give him then the finiſhing Touches; qualifying him to ſpeak plauſibly upon all Subjects, to ſupport with ſpecious Arguments either Side of any Queſtion or Debate, and by falſe Oratory and fallacious Reaſoning, afterwards from Them called Sophiſtical, to corrupt the Hearers, ſilence the Oppoſers, and govern All in all Things. To attain theſe admired Accompliſhments, the young Gentleman was conſtantly to attend, and follow them every where, as long as he thought fit Himſelf; obſerving in what Manner They diſputed *de Quolibet Ente*, on any Point which offered; and learning by degrees to imitate them. Hence that, which we tranſlate *Tuition* or *Teaching*, is every where in *Plato* termed συνεῖναι τοῖς νέοις, *the being accompanied by the Young Men*. Another Part of the Sophiſt's Occupation, quite diſtinct from the former, tho carried on at the ſame Time, was to read Lectures at a certain Price to each Auditor, before as Many as they could procure beforehand to become Subſcribers to them. Theſe Lectures, the Subjects of which were choſen indifferently, were in the Way of Declamations, Diſſertations, or what we commonly call Eſſays, ready compoſed and written down. They were not contrived, however, for the Purpoſe of Teaching or Inſtruction: nor could they indeed effectually ſerve that End; for long Speeches and Lectures are eaſily for-

and his teaching our Young Men, he collected and raised very considerable Sums of Money from this City. Or if you would have another Instance, there is [14] my own Friend, the famous Prodicus; who has frequently been sent hither on several Public Embassys: but the last Time, not long since, when he came as Ambassador from Ceos, his Speeches before the Council gained him great Honour; and his Private Exhibitions in the mean time, together with the Tuition of our Young Men, procured him an immense Heap of Money. But not One of those Ancient Sages ever thought proper to exact Money by way of Fee or Reward for his Teaching; or ever took it into his Head to display his Wisdom before a mixt Multitude. So simple were They; and so

 much

got: but they were calculated merely for Entertainment and Ostentation; and properly enough therefore entitled by the Sophists themselves ἐπιδείξεις, *Exhibitions*. The Third Branch of their Trade, the only one cultivated gratuitously, for the Sake of Fame, tho probably with a View, besides, of gaining Customers in those other the lucrative Branches, was to answer all Questions proposed to them; like the ancient Oracle at *Delphi*, or the Authors of the *Athenian* Oracle in the last Age. Allusions to which Practice of theirs we shall meet with frequently in *Plato*. But in This Passage he had Occasion only to mention their other two Employments, from which immediately accrued their Gain.

[14] In *Prodicus* also were united the two Characters of *Orator* and *Sophist*: as *Philostratus* (in Vit. Sophist.) confirms. That *Socrates* condescended to attend his Lectures, and contracted an Intimacy with him, we learn from several of *Plato*'s Dialogues. The Price paid by Each of his Auditors at those last Exhibitions of his, here mentioned, was 50 δραχμαὶ, or 1*l.* 12*s.* 3½*d.* See *Plat.* in Cratyl. p. 384. and *Aristot.* Rhet. L. 3. C. 14.

much a Secret was it to Them, how valuable a Thing was Money. Whereas Each of the Others, whom I mentioned, has made more Money of his Wiſdom, than [15] any Other Artificer could ever earn from any Art whatever: and prior to Theſe, [16] Protagoras did the ſame.

HIPPIAS.

You know nothing, Socrates, of what high Advantages belong to Our Profeſſion. If you knew but how great have been my own Gains, you would be amazed. To give you only One Inſtance: Going upon a certain Time to Sicily, where Protagoras then reſided, high in Reputation and reverend in Years; I, tho at that time in Age greatly his inferior, gained in a very ſhort Time more than [17] a hundred and fifty Minas: nay, from One Place only, and that a very little one, Inycum, I took above [18] twenty. This when I brought

[15] Ἄλλος δημιουργὸς. The Reaſon, why *Plato* uſes this Word, rather than τεχνικὸς, his uſual Term for *Artiſt*, will appear in his Dialogue named the *Sophiſt*; where he debaſes that Profeſſion below the Rank of the meaneſt Artificer in any uſeful or honeſt Way.

[16] *Protagoras* and his Doctrine make ſo ſhining a Figure in the Works of *Plato*, that, referring our Readers to Them for the Character of this Sophiſt, we ſhall only here obſerve, that He was the Firſt who made his Diſciples pay ſo dearly for his Company, and ſet that extravagant Price upon his Teaching, mentioned in Note 12. which became a Precedent to *Gorgias* and the other Sophiſts of the Firſt Rank. For This many Authoritys may be ſeen, collected by *Creſollius* in Theat. Rhet. p. 457. and ſome by *Menage* in Not. ad *Laert.* p. 420. b.

[17] Equal to 484*l.* 7*s.* 6*d.* *Engliſh* Money.

[18] Equal to 64*l.* 11*s.* 8*d.* In all our Calculations we have followed the uſual Way of Computing; in which an Ounce of the Silver Coin

brought home with me, and preſented to my Father, it ſtruck Him and my other Friends in the City with Wonder and Aſtoniſhment. To ſay the Truth, I am inclined to think, that not any Two of the Sophiſts, name which you pleaſe, taken together, have acquired ſo much Money as my Self.

SOCRATES.

A fair and a notable Evidence have you produced, Hippias, proving not only your own Wiſdom, but how wiſe the World too is become now a days; and what Difference there is between the Modern Wiſdom and the Ancient in Point of Excellence. [19] For of thoſe Predeceſſors of yours there is reported great Folly, according to Your Account of Things. To Anaxagoras, for Inſtance, it is ſaid, happened the Contrary of that lucky Fate, which befel You. For when Great Wealth had been left him, He through Negligence, they ſay, loſt it All: ſo

Coin of *Athens* is valued but at 5*s.* 2*d.* and the *Attic* δραχμὴ is ſuppoſed equal to the *Roman* Denarius; tho, as Dr. *Arbuthnot* judiciouſly obſerves, there is Reaſon to think it was of greater Value.

[19] Τῶν γὰρ προτέρων περὶ Ἀναξαγόρᾳ. In our Tranſlation we have omitted this laſt Word; apprehending it to have been at firſt one of thoſe, ſo frequently of old written on the Margin of Books by way of Explication or Illuſtration, and ſo frequently, when thoſe Books came to be copied afterward, aſſumed into the Text. For, if permitted to remain, it confounds or much diſturbs the Conſtruction; and ſo greatly puzzled the old Tranſlators, that they have ſeverally given this Paſſage four different Meanings, all of them, compared with what follows, evidently ſpoiling the Senſe. We ſhould chuſe therefore to read τῶν γὰρ προτέρων περὶ, λέγεται κ. τ. λ.

[29] ſo ſilly was He with his Wiſdom. And of other Ancient Sages they relate Storys of the ſame Kind. A clear Proof I think therefore, This which you exhibit, in what a wiſe Age we live; and what Diſproportion the Wiſdom of it bears to that of former Times. Many too, I know, are agreed

[30] That this is abſolutely Ironical, we ſhould have preſumed Nobody needed to be told; had not Mr. *Stanley* ſaid, in his *Hiſtory of Philoſophy*, that "*Plato derides Anaxagoras for quitting his Eſtate*;" and in the Margin for Proof cited this Dialogue. His taking *Plato* in this Senſe is the more ſurpriſing, becauſe he had juſt before told us, that *Anaxagoras* was "*Eminent for his noble Birth and wealthy Fortunes*, "*but more for his magnanimous Contempt of them:*" unleſs he imagined that *Plato* had ſo little of the ſame *magnanimous Contempt*, as to aim at making it a Subject of Deriſion. To judge thus, or to attribute to *Plato* ſuch a Meaning, one would imagine belonged only to an *Athenæus*, or a *Lucian*. The Philoſopher is plainly deriding the Avarice of *the Sophiſts*; and to expoſe it the more, ſets it in Contraſt with the oppoſite Diſpoſition of Mind in *Anaxagoras*. Had the *Conduct* indeed of this *latter* been the Point in Queſtion, neither *Socrates* nor *Plato*, 'tis true, would have applauded it: for They to their *Wiſdom* added *Prudence:* but in no Caſe were they capable of ridiculing the Higheſt Attainments, becauſe unattended by thoſe, which were in Their Opinion, tho more neceſſary to *Man*, yet of inferior Dignity in *Nature*. That ſuch was their Opinion, appears from *Ariſtotle*, in *Ethic. Nicom.* L. 6. C. 7, 8. or *Ethic. Eudem.* L. 5. C. 7. where he treats of this very Subject with reference expreſsly to *Anaxagoras* and *Thales:* for that *Ariſtotle*'s Way of Thinking, as to this Point, agreed with *Plato*'s, never has been queſtioned. See likewiſe *Plato de Leg.* L. 5. pag. 743. Before we finiſh this Note, we are deſirous to prevent an Objection, which may ariſe in Favour of Mr. *Stanley*'s Miſtake, from a Paſſage in *Maucroy*'s Tranſlation, a little before this, where thoſe Ancient Sages are ſpoken of all together. We aſſure the Readers then of that Tranſlation, 'tis without the leaſt Warrant from the Original, that the *Frenchman* has there been pleaſed to call them "*les pretenduës Sages.*"

agreed in This Opinion, [21] that a Wiſe Man ought, in the firſt place, to be wiſe to Himſelf. Now the Standard of this Kind of Wiſdom is, it ſeems, He who can get the moſt Money.—But ſo much for This. And now tell me, as to your own Gains, from which of the Citys, whither you have travelled, did you collect the largeſt Sums. Undoubtedly it muſt have been from Sparta, whither you have gone the oftener.

HIPPIAS.

Not from thence, Socrates, by Jove.

SOCRATES.

How ſay you? What, the leaſt Sum from thence?

HIPPIAS.

Never any thing at all.

SOCRATES.

'Tis a Prodigy what you relate: and I am amazed at it, Hippias. But tell me, as to that Wiſdom of yours, has it

[21] *Socrates* throughout this Speech expreſſes himſelf with a ſubtle Ambiguity full of Humour, and not with ſuch a palpable and flat Irony, as all the former Tranſlators groſsly imagined. But moſt remarkably is he thus ambiguous in this Place: where his ſecret Meaning, tho he knew *Hippias* would miſtake it, is to commend true Prudence; from which, ſays *Ariſtotle*, a Man ſeeks τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν, *his own Good*, or *that which is Good with peculiar Reference to Himſelf*. Eth. Nicom. L. 6. C. 9. Conſequently, the Conduct of *Anaxagoras* is here tacitly condemned. 'Tis highly probable, that *Plato* purpoſely inſerted this Paſſage in the Cloſe of the firſt Part of his Introduction, to prevent being miſunderſtood; and thinking it ſeaſonable, at the Time when he was deriding Avarice, before he finiſhed, to guard againſt the Oppoſite Extream.

it not the Power to improve in Virtuous Excellence all your Followers, who are converſant with it, and will learn?

HIPPIAS.

In the higheſt Degree, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Were you able then to improve the Sons of the Inycians, yet wanted ſuch Ability with regard to the Sons of Sparta?

HIPPIAS.

Far from it.

SOCRATES.

The Sicilians then, I warrant, have a Deſire of Virtuous Improvement; but the Spartans, not ſo.

HIPPIAS.

Strongly ſo, Socrates, have the Spartans.

SOCRATES.

Was their Want of Money then the Reaſon, why they followed you not?

HIPPIAS.

By no Means; for of Money they have Plenty.

SOCRATES.

What Account then can be given, in ſuch a Caſe as This, when They were deſirous of Improvement, and in no Want of Money to purchaſe it; and You able to furniſh them with the higheſt Degrees of it; why they did not ſend you away loaded with Riches? What; certainly the Reaſon of it cannot be This, that the Spartans can educate their Sons in a better Manner than

You

You could educate them. Or ſhall we ſay they can? and do You admit this to be true?

HIPPIAS.

By no Means in the World.

SOCRATES.

Were you not able then to perſuade the Young Men at Sparta, that by the Help of Your Converſation they might make greater Advances in Virtue, than ever they could hope to do from the Company and Converſe of their Fathers? Or could you not perſuade thoſe Fathers, that they would do better to commit the Inſtruction of their Sons to Your Management, than to undertake that Care Themſelves, if they had any affectionate Regard for their Offspring? For it could not be that they envy'd their Children the Attainment of the Higheſt Excellence in Virtue.

HIPPIAS.

I have no Suſpicion of their envying them ſuch an Attainment.

SOCRATES.

Well now; and Sparta is really governed by Good Laws.

HIPPIAS.

Who makes a Doubt of it?

SOCRATES.

Very well; and in Citys governed by Good Laws the higheſt Value is ſet on Virtue.

HIPPIAS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

And how to teach Virtue to Others You know beſt of All Men.

HIPPIAS.

By much, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Now the Man, who knows beſt how to teach and impart to Others the Art of Horſemanſhip, of all Countrys in Greece would not ſuch a Man meet with moſt Honour, and acquire moſt Wealth, in [22] Theſſaly, and wherever elſe this Art was cultivated moſt?

HIPPIAS.

'Tis probable he would.

SOCRATES.

And will not the Man, who is capable of delivering the moſt valuable Inſtructions with regard to Virtue, meet with moſt Honour, and pick up moſt Money too, if he be That way inclined, in Sparta, and every other Grecian City governed by good Laws? But in [23] Sicily, my Friend, rather do you ſuppoſe, or at Inycum? Ought we, Hippias, to give Credit to this? for if You ſay it, we muſt believe.

HIPPIAS.

[22] See the Beginning of *Plato*'s *Meno*.

[23] The *Sicilians* were as infamous for *Luxury*, as the *Spartans* were illuſtrious for *Virtue*. Whence the *Greek* Proverb, Σικελικὴ τράπεζα; and the Latin, *Siculæ dapes*.

HIPPIAS.

The Truth is, Socrates, that the Spartans hold it [24] Sacred to make no Innovation in their Laws; and to educate their Youth in no other Way, than what is agreeable to their [25] Ancient Uſages.

SOCRATES.

How ſay you? do the Spartans hold it Sacred, not to do what is right, but to do the Contrary?

HIPPIAS.

I would not ſay any ſuch thing, not I, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Would not they do right then to educate their Sons in the Better Way, and not in the Worſe?

HIPPIAS.

'Tis true, they would: but the Laws do not permit them to have their Youth educated by [26] Foreigners, or after

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[24] This Sacred Authority, which the *Spartans* attributed to the Laws of their Country, was owing partly to the Sanction given to thoſe Laws by the *Delphian Oracle*; as appears from *Xenophon*'s ſhort Obſervations upon the *Lacedæmonian Polity*; and partly to the Sanction of an *Oath* taken by their Anceſtors, thro a Stratagem of *Lycurgus*, to maintain his Laws inviolable: for which ſee *Plutarch*'s Life of that Legiſlator, towards the End.

[25] The Manner of the *Spartan Education* may be ſeen at large in *Cragius* de *Repub. Lacedæm.* Lib. 3.

[26] The *Spartans*, above all People being attached to the ancient Conſtitution of their Government and Laws, were extreamly jealous of having a *Taſt* introduced among them for *Foreign Manners* and *Faſhions*; becauſe they were well aware, that by this Means an *Eſſential Change*

a Foreign Mode. For, be aſſured, if any Foreigner ever acquired Wealth at Sparta by teaching or inſtructing their Youth, much more ſo ſhould I: ſince they take great Pleaſure in hearing my Diſſertations, and give me high Encomiums: but in the Affair of Education, the Law, as I ſaid, does not permit them the Benefit of My Inſtructions.

SOCRATES.

The Law, Hippias, do you ſuppoſe miſchievous to the Publick, or beneficial?

HIPPIAS.

'Tis inſtituted, I preſume, for the Benefit of the Publick: but ſometimes, where the Frame of the Law is bad, it proves a Public Miſchief.

SOCRATES.

Well; but do not Legiſlators always frame the Law with a View of procuring for the Publick the greateſt Good? and becauſe without Law 'twere impoſſible to live in a State of Order and good Government.

HIPPIAS.

Without Doubt, they do.

SOCRATES.

When Thoſe therefore, who undertake the making Laws, fail of procuring Good, they have miſſed their End, and erred

in their *Conſtitution* would gradually follow and take place. This Jealouſy of theirs they carried to ſuch a Height, that they ſuffered no Foreigner, or Perſon of Foreign Education, to take up his conſtant Reſidence in *Sparta*; nor any of their own People to reſide for any conſiderable Length of Time in Foreign Countrys.

erred from good Government and Law. Or How ſay you otherwiſe?

HIPPIAS.

Accurately ſpeaking, Socrates, I muſt own the Thing is ſo: but Men are not uſed to affix ſuch a Meaning to the Word, Law.

SOCRATES.

Do you ſpeak of Men who know what Law means, or of Men who want that Knowlege?

HIPPIAS.

I ſpeak of the Bulk of Mankind, the Multitude.

SOCRATES.

Are Theſe ſuch as know the Truth of Things, this Multitude?

HIPPIAS.

Certainly, not.

SOCRATES.

But Thoſe who have that Knowlege, the Wiſe, hold That, which is more Beneficial, to be in Reality, and according to the Truth of Things, more a Law to all Men, than what is leſs Beneficial. Do not You agree with them in this?

HIPPIAS.

I agree, that in Reality ſo it is.

SOCRATES.

Is not the Nature and the Condition of every Thing ſuch, as Thoſe hold it to be, who are really Knowing in the Thing?

HIPPIAS.

HIPPIAS.

Undoubtedly.

SOCRATES.

Now to the Spartans, you ſay, an Education under You a Foreigner, and after a Foreign Manner, would be more beneficial, than to be educated after the Manner of their own Country.

HIPPIAS.

And I ſay what is True.

SOCRATES.

And That, which is more beneficial, is more a Law. This you ſay likewiſe, Hippias.

HIPPIAS.

I have admitted it ſo to be.

SOCRATES.

According therefore to Your Account, to have the Sons of the Spartans educated under Hippias, is more agreeable to Law; and their Education under their Fathers is more repugnant to Law; ſuppoſing that from You they would receive Advantages really greater.

HIPPIAS.

And ſo indeed would they, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Now from hence it follows, that the Spartans violate the Law, in not making You Preſents of Money, and committing their Sons to Your Care.

HIPPIAS.

HIPPIAS.

Be it ſo: For you ſeem to argue thus in My Favour; and it is not My Buſineſs to controvert your Argument.

SOCRATES.

Violaters of the Law then, my Friend, we find theſe Spartans, and That in the moſt important Article too; Theſe, who are thought to be the greateſt Obſervers of it. — But in the Name of the Gods, Hippias, of what Kind are thoſe Diſſertations, for which they give you thoſe high Encomiums? and upon what Topicks do they take that great Pleaſure in hearing you harangue? No Doubt, they muſt be the ſame, in which You have ſo much excellent Knowlege; thoſe, which relate to the Stars and the Phænomena of the Sky.

HIPPIAS.

[27] They by no Means endure to hear a Word upon Theſe Subjects.

SOCRATES.

[27] The Polity of the *Spartans* was contrived with a View of making them a *military* People. For this Reaſon, the mechanical and neceſſary Arts were left to Servants and Slaves; and Such Part only of the Liberal Kind was admitted amongſt them, as contributed to Military Skill, or fitted them for the Toils and the Stratagems of War. But Philoſophy and the Sciences are ſaid to have been wholly excluded. Many Paſſages from the Ancients in Proof of this are collected by the Annotators on *Ælian*. Var. Hiſt. L. 12. C. 50. and by *Nic. Craig*, in his Treatiſe before-cited, L. 3. Perhaps, however, it was only ſo in Appearance: It may be worth while to examine and conſider well what *Plato* ſays on this Subject in his *Protagoras*, pag. 342.

SOCRATES.

But they take Pleaſure in hearing a Lecture upon the Subject of Geometry.

HIPPIAS.

Not at all: for Many of the Spartans know not even the Common Rules of Arithmetick; nay, ſcarcely, I may ſay, how to reckon,

SOCRATES.

They are far from enduring then to hear you diſcourſe on the Nature of [28] Numbers and Accounts.

HIPPIAS.

[28] The *Mathematical Sciences* are here enumerated, not as they ſtand ranked in their *natural* Order, beginning with the moſt ſimple and fundamental; but in an Order *inverted*, beginning with the higheſt or firſt in Dignity, to which the Others ſerve as Steps. This is done with great Propriety. For 'tis agreeable to the uſual Politeneſs and Addreſs of *Socrates*, to preſume at firſt that the Diſſertations of *Hippias* were of the *nobler* and more learned Kind; and then, finding it otherwiſe, to deſcend gradually to the Mention of thoſe Mathematical Subjects which were the *meaneſt*. The Science indeed of *Muſick*, in the Order of Things, as well as in that of Teaching, comes *after* the Science of *Arithmetick*, according to the *Platonic* Doctrine: yet perhaps it is placed the *laſt*, as if *loweſt* in Dignity, becauſe, the Subject of it being *Sound*, a Thing *ſenſible*, *external* and *paſſing*, it is farther removed from the *Science of Mind* than pure *Arithmetick*, the Subject of which is abſtract *Number*, a Thing *Mental* and *eternal*. It is alſo true, that the *Heavenly Bodys*, the Subjects of *Aſtronomy*, are not *Mental*, nor in a *proper* Senſe *eternal*: yet, becauſe they are the *Great* and *moſt comprehenſive Parts of Nature*, the *Primary Diviſion* of the *Univerſe*, obvious to Sight; and alſo becauſe they are *permanent* and *undecaying*, giving us an *Image* of *Eternity*; therefore the Science, converſant about Theſe, is by the *Platoniſts* held the *nobleſt* of thoſe called *Mathematical*.

HIPPIAS.

Very far from That, by Jupiter.

SOCRATES.

The Subjects, then, I warrant you, are Thoſe, upon which You are able to differt, divide and diſtinguiſh, with the greateſt Accuracy of all Men; [29] concerning the Power of Letters and Syllables, of Harmonys and Rythms.

HIPPIAS.

What Harmonys, or what Letters, my Good Man, do They concern themſelves about?

SOCRATES.

Well; what Are the Subjects then, upon which they attend to you with ſo much Pleaſure to Themſelves, and ſo much Commendation of You? Tell me your Self, ſince I cannot find it out.

HIPPIAS.

[29] The *Spartans* were not more remarkable for a *Contempt* of Grammar and Mathematicks, than was *Hippias* for his *Skill* in thoſe Sciences; as appears from the ſhorter Dialogue called by His Name. This Part of the Introduction, the third and laſt, receives much Grace from both theſe Circumſtances. For the Mention of the Sciences here in this Manner, with a Mixture of *Compliment* and *Humour*, ſeems to ariſe naturally from the Character of the *Perſon* with whom *Socrates* is converſing, and from that of the *People* who are the preſent Subject of this Part of their Converſation. *Plato* uſes ſuch exquiſite Art in the Oeconomy of his Dialogues, that whatever is brought upon the Carpet appears to fall in naturally: at the ſame time that all the Circumſtances of it harmoniſe together; and every Particular contributes to carry on his Deſigns, either the principal or ſubordinate; being indeed purpoſely introduced for the Sake of Theſe.

HIPPIAS.

Concerning the Genealogys, O Socrates, of the Heroes and of Men; concerning the Migration of Tribes, and ſettling of Colonys; the Antiquity and firſt Foundation of Citys; in a Word, concerning every thing in Ancient Story, they hearken to me with the utmoſt Pleaſure. So that I have been obliged to ſtudy thoſe Things my Self for Their Sakes, and to perfect my ſelf in all that Sort of Knowlege.

SOCRATES.

By Jove, Hippias, it was fortunate for You, that the Spartans take no Pleaſure in hearing a Man reckon up Our Archons from [30] the Time of Solon. For if they did, the perfecting your ſelf in ſuch a Catalogue would put you to no little Trouble.

HIPPIAS.

Why ſo, Socrates? Upon hearing Fifty Names repeated only Once, I will undertake to remember them.

SOCRATES.

[30] This was the *Æra* of the *Athenian Greatneſs*. For the Lenity of *Solon*'s Laws, the Limitation which they gave to the formidable Power of a perpetual Senate, and the Popular Liberty which they eſtabliſhed, produced in the People ſuch a Spirit; the Conſequence always of Lenity in the Government, Legal Liberty, and a Share of Power; that *Athens* ſoon grew able to rival *Sparta*, and to be her Competitor for the chief Sway and Leading in the General Affairs of *Greece*. *Plato* here therefore intends a fine *Compliment* to his *Country*. That he could have no contrary View is evident; becauſe the *Archons*, or Chief Magiſtrates of *Athens*, had been elected annually, Nine in Number, 80 Years before the Archonſhip of *Solon*, when his Laws were inſtituted. *Plato* would not have *bounded* his Liſt of *Archons* with the Time of *Solon*, had his Intention been to *ſatyrize* the *Athenian Conſtitution*; as it may ſeem to Some, who imagine him in all things to be in Jeſt, and always Satyrical.

SOCRATES.

It is true; [31] but I did not conſider that you had an excellent Memory. So, now I conceive the Reaſon, why in all Probability the Spartans are delighted with you: 'tis becauſe you know ſuch a Multitude of Things; and are of the ſame Uſe to Them, that Old Women are to Children, to entertain them with the Recital of pretty Fables, and Old Storys.

HIPPIAS.

And by Jove, Socrates, upon a Manly Subject too, that of Beauty in Manners. For diſcourſing there lately of a compleat Rule of Manners becoming a Young Man, I gained much Applauſe. And I take this Opportunity, to inform you,

[31] There is a Paſſage in the *Io*, p. 56. of our Tranſlation, which may ſerve to ſhew us the ſecret Meaning of This. *Socrates* there, with an Ironical Ambiguity, ſays to *Io*, "*It ill becomes a Man, who is a Rhapſodiſt, to be forgetful.*" The obvious Import of which Words is only this, that *'tis neceſſary for a Rhapſodiſt to remember a great Number of Verſes*: but, in their latent Senſe, they allude to the common Proverb, that *Liars ought to have good Memorys*: a Proverb, which the *Romans* probably borrowed from the *Greeks*; as it is certain that We *Engliſh* derived it from the former. See *Eraſm. Adag.* Chil. 2. Cent. 3. N. 74. The ſame Alluſion ſeems to be here couched under an Acknowlegement of *Io*'s uncommon Degree of Memory, carrying with it this concealed Meaning—*I had forgot that you were a great Liar*, and therefore a proper Perſon to relate Falſhoods for Truth. This Interpretation is confirmed by the ſtrong Hint given immediately after, that thoſe ancient Traditionary Storys current amongſt the *Greeks*, on which their Religion was founded, were falſe and meerly fabulous. But the double Meaning is more obſcure in this Place than in the other, for the Reaſon given in the *Argument* to this Dialogue, p. 10.

that I have a Diſſertation upon this Subject, extremely beautiful, finely framed in every reſpect, but particularly admirable for the [32] Choice of Words. The Occaſion, or Way of introducing my Diſcourſe, is This: After the Taking of Troy, Neoptolemus is ſuppoſed to aſk Advice of Neſtor, and to inquire of him, what Courſe of Life a Young Man ought to follow, in order to acquire Renown and Glory. Upon this, Neſtor ſpeaks, and lays down a great many excellent Precepts concerning the Beauty of Manners and a well-regulated Life. [33] This Diſſertation I exhibited at Sparta; and three Days hence am to exhibit the Same here at Athens, in the School of Phidoſtratus, together with ſeveral other Pieces of mine, worth the Hearing. I do it at the Requeſt of Eudicus, the Son of Apemantus. You will not fail, I hope,

[32] The Sophiſts were remarkably curious upon this Head. The Words, which they affected to uſe, were the ſmooth, the ſoft, and the delicate; the pompous, and the highly-compound; the ſplendid, the florid, the figurative and poetical; the quaint, and the uncommon; the antique, and obſolete; with many new ones of their own Invention; all in ſhort, which any way ſerved to pleaſe the Senſe, or amuſe the Fancy, without informing the Underſtanding. Inſtances of all which are recorded in the Ancient Criticks, and may be ſeen collected, many of them, by *Creſollius* in *Theat. Rhet.* L. 3. C. 23. As to the Diction of *Hippias* in particular, it is repreſented by *Maximus Tyrius*, C. 23. to have been empty and unmeaning, and his Eloquence void of Solidity.

[33] This boaſted Diſſertation of *Hippias* was intitled Τρωϊκὸς: as we learn from *Philoſtratus*, in whoſe Time it appears to have been extant. The Plan of Manners, which it laid down, if we may conjecture from the Title, was taken from the Characters of the Heroes in *Homer*'s *Iliad*, chiefly from that of *Achilles*, *Hippias*'s Favourite. See the ſhorter Dialogue, called by His Name.

hope, being preſent at it your Self, and bringing Others with you to be of the Audience, Such as are capable Judges of Performances of this Kind.

SOCRATES.

We ſhall do ſo, Hippias; if ſo it pleaſe God. But at preſent anſwer me a ſhort Queſtion relating to your Diſſertation. For you have happily reminded me. You muſt know, my Friend, that a [34] certain Perſon puzzled me lately, in a Converſation we had together; after I had been inveighing againſt ſome Things for their Baſeneſs and Deformity, and praiſing ſome other Things for their Excellence and Beauty; by attacking me with Theſe Queſtions, in a very inſolent Manner.—" Whence came You, Socrates, ſaid he, to " know what Things are beautiful, and what are otherwiſe? " [35] For can you tell me now, What the Beautifull is?"—I, thro

[34] This certain Perſon was no other, than that *Divine Principle within the Mind*, by Us commonly called *Conſcience*; never failing either to blame or commend a Man, who inwardly attends to it, after any thing ſaid or done by Himſelf. It is very probable, that *Lord Shaftſbury* had from hence the firſt Hint of that Practice, ſo much recommended by him in his Treatiſe entitled *Soliloquy*, that of *dividing our ſelves into Two Perſons, taking our ſelves to Taſk, and queſtioning our ſelves.* For, tho many Ancient Writings, particularly the *Diſſertations* of *Epictetus* by *Arrian*, abound with Examples of ſome ſuch Kind of Exerciſe; yet This Inſtance of *Self-Examination*, given us here by *Plato*, is moſt of all exactly and literally the Same with That deſcribed by his Noble modern Diſciple. See *Characteriſt.* vol. 1. p. 168, 169, 195.

[35] *Plato* has finely contrived to introduce immediately his Inquiry concerning the *Sovereign Beauty*, by the Mention of this Diſſertation concerning

thro the Meanneſs of my Knowlege found my ſelf at a Loſs, and had nothing to anſwer him with any Propriety. So quitting his Company, I grew angry with my ſelf, reproached my ſelf, and threatened, that, as ſoon as ever I could meet with Any of You Wiſe Men, I would hear what he had to ſay upon the Subject, and learn, and ſtudy it thoroughly; and That done, would return to my Queſtioner, and battle the Point with him over again. Now therefore, as I ſaid, you are come happily for Me. Give me ample Information then accordingly, concerning the Nature of the Beautifull itſelf: and endeavour to be as accurate as poſſible in your Anſwers to what I ſhall aſk you: that I may not be confuted a ſecond time, and deſervedly again laught at. For You underſtand the Queſtion, no Doubt, perfectly well. To You ſuch a Piece of Knowlege can be but a little one, amongſt the Multitude of thoſe, which You are Maſter of.

HIPPIAS.

Little enough, by Jove, Socrates; and ſcarcely of any Value at all.

SOCRATES.

The more eaſily then ſhall I learn it; and not be confuted or puzzled any more upon that Point by Any Man.

HIPPIAS.

concerning the *Beauty of Manners*; on purpoſe to have an Opportunity of inculcating This Leſſon — that without ſuch a Previous Inquiry 'tis impoſſible to know, What Manners are Beautiful—for he taught, that the *Science of Morals* depended on the *Prime Science*, that of *Mind*. See the latter Part of that admirable Speech, ſpoken by *Socrates*, in the *Sympoſium*.

HIPPIAS.

Not by Any Man. For otherwiſe would My Skill be mean, and nothing beyond Vulgar Attainment.

SOCRATES.

'Twill be a brave Thing, by Juno, Hippias, to get the Better of the Man, as You promiſe me we ſhall. But ſhall I be any Obſtacle to the Victory, if I imitate His Manner, and, after you have anſwered ſome Queſtion of mine, make Objections to your Anſwer; for the Sake only of more thorough Information from You: for [36] I have a tolerable Share of Experience in the Practice of making Objections. If it be no Difference therefore to You, I ſhould be glad to have the Part of an Objector allowed me, in order to be made a better Maſter of the Subject.

HIPPIAS.

Take the Part of an Objector then: for, as I ſaid juſt now, 'tis no very knotty Point, that which You inquire about. I could teach you to anſwer Queſtions much more difficult

[36] The Meaning is, that he was accuſtomed to the Practice of *reaſoning with Himſelf*, taking *Exceptions* to the Account of Things given by *Fancy* or *Opinion*, and *diſputing* all the plauſible *Appearances* of the One, and poſitive *Aſſertions* of the Other. *Plato* by this Paſſage prepares us for that Part of the Dialogue, upon which we are juſt entring: where *Socrates* argues in the Perſon of his ΔΑΙΜΩΝ, the *Reſtraining* and *Controuling* Power within him; and *Hippias* ſpeaks the Part of *Fancy*: in the Perſon of whom this Sophiſt commends, as ſupremely Beautiful and Amiable, ſuch Things as Fancy is uſed to paint in thoſe Colours; and exhibits them in the ſame Order, in which they uſually recommend themſelves to the Mind.

difficult than this, in ſuch a Manner, that None ſhould ever be able to refute you.

SOCRATES.

O Rare! what Good News you tell me! But come, ſince You bid me your Self, I will put my ſelf in the Place of my Antagoniſt, try to be what He is, to the beſt of my Power, and in His Perſon begin to queſtion you. Now if He were of the Audience, when you exhibited that Diſſertation, which you talk of, concerning the Beauty of Manners, after he had heard it through, and You had done ſpeaking, This Point rather than any other would be uppermoſt in his Mind to queſtion you upon, This relating to the Beautifull: for he has a certain Habit of ſo doing: and thus would he introduce it.—"Elean Stranger! I would "aſk you, whether it is not by having Honeſty, that Honeſt "Men are Honeſt?"—Anſwer now, Hippias, as if He propoſed the Queſtion.

HIPPIAS.

I ſhall anſwer—It is by their having Honeſty.

SOCRATES.

Is not This ſome certain Thing then, this Honeſty?

HIPPIAS.

Clearly ſo.

SOCRATES.

And is it not likewiſe by their having Wiſdom, that Wiſe Men are Wiſe? and by having Good in them, that all Good Things are Good?

HIPPIAS.

HIPPIAS.

Without Diſpute.

SOCRATES.

And are not Theſe ſome certain [37] real Things? for they are not ſurely Non-Entitys, by whoſe intimate Preſence with other Things thoſe Things are what they are.

HIPPIAS.

Undoubtedly, real Things.

SOCRATES.

I aſk you then, whether all Things, which are Beautiful, are not in like manner Beautiful by their having Beauty?

HIPPIAS.

They are, by their having Beauty.

SOCRATES.

Some certain real Thing, this Beauty.

HIPPIAS.

A real Thing. But what is to come of all this?

SOCRATES.

Tell me now, Friend Stranger, will he ſay, What this Thing is, this Beauty, or the Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

Does not the Propoſer of this Queſtion deſire to have it told him, What is Beautiful?

SOCRATES.

[37] This is levelled againſt Thoſe, who maintained, that *Mind* and the *Objects of Mind* have no *Real Being*; attributing Reality to Nothing but That, which they are able ἁπτὸς ταῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, ſays *Plato*, (Theætet. p. 155.) *to take faſt Hold of with their Hands*; or, at leaſt, which is the Object of one or other of their Senſes.

SOCRATES.

I think not, Hippias: but to have it told him, What the Beautifull is.

HIPPIAS.

How does This differ from That?

SOCRATES.

Do you think there is no Difference between them?

HIPPIAS.

There is not Any.

SOCRATES.

You certainly know better. [38] Obſerve, my good Friend, what the Queſtion is. For he aſks you, not what is Beautiful, but what is The Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

I apprehend you, honeſt Friend. And to That Queſtion, What is The Beautifull, I ſhall give an Anſwer, ſuch a one as never can be confuted. For be aſſured, Socrates, if the Truth muſt be told, a Beautiful Maiden is the Thing Beautiful.

SOCRATES.

An excellent Anſwer, [39] by the Dog, Hippias; and ſuch a

[38] The *Greek*, as it is printed, is ὅμως—ἄθρει. But the Senſe, as we apprehend, not admitting an *Adverſative Adverb*, the true Reading probably is ὁμόσε or ὁμῦ—ἄθρει, that is, *Look cloſe*, or *near*: for the *Attic Writers* uſed the Word ὁμῦ to ſignify the ſame with ἰσχύς. See *Harpocrat.* p. 130, 131. Ed. Gronov.

[39] *Plato* has in his Dialogues drawn the Picture of his Hero with an Exactneſs ſo minute, that he ſeems not to have omitted the leaſt Peculiarity

a one, as cannot fail of being applauded. Shall I then, in anſwering thus, have anſwered the Queſtion aſked me? and that ſo well, as not to be refuted?

HIPPIAS.

How ſhould you be refuted, Socrates, in avowing That, which is the Opinion of all the World; and the Truth of which All who hear you will atteſt?

SOCRATES.

Be it ſo then, by all Means. But now, Hippias, let me alone to reſume the Queſtion, with Your Anſwer to it, by my Self. The Man will interrogate me after this Manner.

 —An-

liarity in the ordinary Converſation of that Great Man. Of this we have here an Inſtance very remarkable. *Socrates*, it ſeems, in common Diſcourſe uſed frequently to ſwear by Brute Animals. The different Reaſons which have been aſſigned for his ſo doing, and the various Cenſures paſſed on him, may be ſeen collected by *Menage* in Not. ad *Laert.* p. 92, 93. *M. Maſſieu* in the firſt Tome of *Les Mem. de l'Acad. des Inſcript. & Belles Lett.* p. 205. and by *M. du Soul* in Not. ad *Lucian.* vol. 1. p. 556. Ed. *Hemſterhus*. Thus much is evident, that the *Cretans* had a Law or Cuſtom, introduced amongſt them by *Rhadamanthus*, to uſe that very Kind of Oaths; on purpoſe to avoid naming, on every trivial Occaſion, the Gods in whom they believed. See the Authors cited by *Olearius* in Not. ad *Philoſtrat.* p. 257. n. 22. That the great *Athenian Philoſopher* followed in This the Example of the old *Cretan Judge* and Lawgiver, is the Opinion of *Porphyry*, in L. 3. *de Abſtinent.* §. 16. and indeed is in the higheſt Degree probable; becauſe we find *Socrates* ſwearing by the very ſame Species of Animals, adjured commonly by the *Cretans*. The Dog is named the moſt frequently in the Oaths of Both; probably becauſe Domeſtic, and the moſt frequently in Sight when they were talking. See the *Scholiaſt* on *Ariſtoph.* Av. ℣. 521. and *Suidas* in voce Ῥαδαμάνθυος ὅρκος.

— Anſwer me, Socrates, and tell me, [40] if there be any ſuch Thing as the Beautifull itſelf, [41] to whoſe Preſence is owing the Beauty of all thoſe Things, which you call Beautiful. Then ſhall I anſwer him thus; — [42] A beautiful Maiden

[40] The *Greek* is, εἴ τι ἐϛὶν αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν. Among the *Attic* Writers εἰ has often the Force of an *Adverb* of *Interrogation*, ſignifying "*whether*;" like the *Engliſh* Particle "*if*." This is one of the many Idioms of our Language, correſponding with thoſe of the ancient *Attic Greek*. But this Idiom ſeems not to have been well known, or at leaſt not here obſerved, by any of the Tranſlators: for they all interpret this Part of the Sentence in a *Conditional* Senſe, making εἰ a *Conditional Conjunction*. Nor does it indeed appear to have been better known to thoſe old Tranſcribers of the Original, from whoſe Copys are printed the Editions we have of *Plato*. For their Ignorance in this Point ſeems to have occaſioned thoſe Corruptions of the Text, taken Notice of in the two following Notes.

[41] The whole Sentence in the preſent Editions ſtands thus: Ἴθι μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι· ταῦτα πάντα ἃ φὴς καλὰ εἶναι, εἴ τι ἐϛὶν αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καλά; In the latter Part of this Sentence there is undoubtedly an *Omiſſion*; which we ought to ſupply thus; ΔΙ. Ὃ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καλά, as we read in the Sentence following, where *Socrates* repeats the Terms of the Queſtion: or rather, Ω κ. τ. λ. the Dative Caſe having been uſed by *Socrates* juſt before, when he ſtated the Queſtion firſt.

[42] The *Greek* is printed thus: Ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ ἐρῶ, ὅτι εἰ παρθένος καλὴ, καλόν ἐϛι δι' ὃ ταῦτ ἂν εἴη καλά. But the Senſe evidently requires us to expunge the Word εἰ before παρθένος, and to read, — ὅτι παρθένος καλὴ καλόν ἐϛι, κ. τ. λ. The Author of this Interpolation, no doubt, intended to make this Sentence anſwer to the former; and thus compleated the Series of Blunders, which aroſe gradually from that Ignorance of the *Attic Idiom*, uſed in the former Sentence, of which we accuſed the Tranſcribers in Note 40. This laſt Blunder has been the Source of another, a moſt ridiculous one, made by *Auguſtinus Niphus*, in a *Latin* Treatiſe

Maiden is That Beautifull, to whoſe Preſence thoſe other Things owe their Beauty.

HIPPIAS.

[45] Well; and do You imagine, after This that he will ever think of refuting you? or attempt to prove Your Anſwer

Treatiſe *de Pulchro*. His Intention, in the former Part of that Work, is to illuſtrate the *Greater Hippias* of *Plato*. In Purſuance of which he thinks it incumbent on him, in the firſt place, to prove the Excellence of *ſome Particular* Beauty; ſuch as may beſt ſhew, we preſume he means, the Perfection of the Ideal Pattern. For this Purpoſe, he politely and gallantly urges the following Argument, manifeſtly borrowed from the Error complained of in this Note: "If the *Princeſs Joan of* "*Arragon* be beautiful without a Fault, then there muſt be Something "abſolutely beautiful *in the Nature of Things*: But None can deny the "faultleſs Beauty of the *Princeſs Joan*: Therefore, *&c.*" And in Proof of his laſt Poſition, he gives us a long Detail of the Charms of that Princeſs; ſuch as, beſides the Beautys of her Mind and Sweetneſs of her Manners, her Golden Locks, Blue Eyes, Dimpled Chin, *&c. &c. &c.* from Head to Foot.

[43] *Hippias* was intirely a Stranger to the Theory of Mind, and had never thought or heard of any *Univerſal Principle* in Nature; conſequently, had no Conception of any other Beauty, than what was external, and exiſted in *Things Particular*. Not only therefore did he miſtake the Queſtion propoſed by *Socrates*; but every Explication, given of it afterwards, he adapted to thoſe Notions, with which his Mind was prepoſſeſſed. Thus, the Character of the Beautifull, which *Socrates* here deſcribes, in order to ſhew *Hippias* the Abſurdity of his Firſt Definition, ſerves, we find, but to confirm him in his Errors. It is clear therefore, that he underſtood this Deſcription in the Senſe of Lovers. For tho 'tis poſſible he never might have felt the ſweet Enthuſiaſm of Love, he had been a great Dabbler, we know, in Poetry; (See *Plato*'s *Leſſer Hippias*;) and Poets in all Ages have agreed in repreſenting all the natural Sentiments of Lovers almoſt in the ſame Manner. The Sentiment,

which

ſwer concerning the Thing Beautiful not a juſt Anſwer? or if he ſhould attempt it, that he would not be ridiculous?

SOCRATES.

That he will attempt it, Friend, I am well aſſured: but whether in ſo doing he will be ridiculous, will appear in the Attempt itſelf. However, I'll tell you, what He will ſay.

HIPPIAS.

Tell me then.

SOCRATES.

How pleaſant you are, Socrates! he will ſay. Is not a beautiful Mare then a Thing Beautiful? commended as ſuch even by the [44] Divine Oracle. What ſhall we anſwer, Hippias?

which *Hippias* had in his Mind, is, with the greateſt Propriety of the Place and of the Objects, thus expreſſed by *Virgil*,

Phyllidis adventu noſtræ nemus omne virebit.

Ecl. 7. ℣. 59.

At Phyllis' dear Approach, through all the Grove
Each Tree ſhall deck him in his gayeſt Green.

[44] The Oracle, here meant, is recorded at large by *Jo. Tzetzes*, Chil. 9. cap. 291. of which only the following Verſe relates to the preſent Subject.

Ἵπποι Θρηΐκιαι, Λακεδαιμόνιαί τε γυναῖκες.

The Dames of Sparta, and the Mares of Thrace
Excell amongſt the Females of their Kind.

Out

pias? Shall we not acknowlege, that a Mare is beautiful likewiſe? meaning a Beautiful Mare. For indeed how ſhould we dare deny, that a Beautiful Thing is beautiful?

HIPPIAS.

True, Socrates. And, no Doubt, the God rightly gave that Commendation: for with [45] Us too there are Mares exceedingly beautiful.

SOCRATES.

Out of this the *Grecians*, with a little Alteration made a *Proverb*, current amongſt them,

Ἵππον Θεσσαλικὴν, Λακεδαιμονίην τε γυναῖκα.

A Spartan Dame, and a Theſſalian Mare.

See *Barthius* on *Claudian.* de 4to Conſ. Hon. ad ℣. 543. pag. 697.

Hence it aroſe in Time, that the Words of the Oracle itſelf ſuffered a Change; and inſtead of Θρηΐκιαι was ſubſtituted Θεσσαλικαὶ: with which Alteration we find the Oracle cited again by the ſame *Tzetzes*, Chil. 10. C. 330. That the former Word is the true Reading, and the latter a Corruption, rather than the Reverſe of this, is probable from the Authority of a Writer, the moſt ancient of thoſe who cite this Oracle, *Euſebius*, in *Præp. Ev.* L. 5. C. 27. pag. 132. Ed. R. Steph.

[45] We learn from *Plutarch*, vol. 2. p. 303. that the People of *Elis* carried their Mares into other Countrys, to be covered. 'Tis probable therefore, that they encouraged only the *Female* Breed of that Animal at Home: eſpecially if it be true what *Pliny* and *Servius* write, that Mares are better for a long Race. See the Annotators on *Virgil*, Georg. 1. ℣. 59. The *Eleans* were undoubtedly thus curious about the Breed, on account of the *Chariot-Races* in the Olympic Games; which were celebrated in Their Country, and from which they derived the Advantage of being ſuffered to enjoy a conſtant Peace, with Liberty and Honour,

SOCRATES.

Very well now, will He ſay: but what, is not a beautiful Lyre too a Thing Beautiful? Shall we allow it, Hippias?

HIPPIAS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

After This he will ſay, (for with tolerable Certainty I can gueſs he will, from my Knowlege of his Character;) But what think you of a beautiful [46] Soop-Pan, you Simpleton You? is not That a Thing Beautiful then?

HIPPIAS.

Et quas Elis opes ante pararat equis.

Propert. L. 1. El. 8. ℣. 36.

And by her Mares, ſo fleet in Race to run,
The Wealth which Elis anciently had won.

[46] A negligent Reader will be apt to ſuppoſe, that the latter Three of theſe four Inſtances of Beauty exiſting in Particulars, the *Maiden*, the *Mare*, the *Lyre*, and the *Soop-Diſh*, are preſented to us by *Plato*, juſt as Chance offered them to his own Mind. But *Plato* is not ſo negligent a Writer. A Reader who is attentive, tho not converſant in the Depth of theſe Divine Writings, may obſerve a Gradation of Excellence in theſe Four Forms: the Firſt, *intelligent* and *rational*; the Second, indued with *Senſe*, and an *inward Principle* of *Life* and *Motion*; the Third, capable of producing *Harmony*, exciting the *Affections*, and influencing the *Mind*; the Laſt, capable only of *ſimple Sound*, and miniſtring only to Uſes of the *Body*. But This is far from being the Whole of what is here intended. For *Plato* has, in all he writes, a Meaning much more deep and important. The Affair in Agitation is no leſs, than the putting us upon Inquiry, and the giving us ſome Inſight, into the *Sovereign Beauty*, with the *ſeveral Kinds ſubordinate*.

Now

HIPPIAS.

Who is this Man, Socrates? I warrant, ſome unmannerly and ill-bred Fellow, to dare mention Things ſo mean and contemptible, upon a Subject ſo noble and ſo reſpectable.

SOCRATES.

Now the Human Form, when excellent in the Kind, being by Nature the moſt pleaſing to Man, of all Forms external, is naturally pitched upon by *Hippias*, (who had no Notion of Univerſal Beauty, nor indeed of any other than Corporeal,) for the *perfect Pattern* or *juſt Standard* of all Beauty: in which Senſe he at firſt underſtood the Queſtion. From hence *Socrates* takes Occaſion to ſuggeſt, what the *Cauſe* is of this pre-eminent Beauty of the Human Form: and to inſinuate, that a *Fine Woman*, conſidered in any other View than as partaking of *Reaſon* and *Underſtanding*, is nothing ſuperior to an Irrational Animal, ſuch a one as is *beautiful*, with Affections *mild* and *generous:* that if, in the Conſideration of Beauty, not only *Reaſon*, but all *inward Principle* of *Harmony* and *Spring* of *Action*, is left out of the Queſtion, let the *Body* be ever ſo finely framed, or ever ſo delicate in its Compoſition, 'tis an *Inſtrument* fitted indeed to give *Sounds* which can *ſtrike* the *Soul* or *entertain* the *Mind*, but is nothing more; it is like the *Lyre* without the *Muſician:* that, if even this Reference to *Soul* and *Mind* be ſuppoſed wanting, if there be no Fineneſs of the *Organs* adminiſtring to *Senſe* and *Reaſon*, and the Beauty lye but *Skin-deep*, or at moſt preſenting an Idea of *ſound Fleſh* and *healthy Blood*, 'tis, in the natural Order of Things, but equal to a *beautiful Soop-Diſh*, filled with *good Meat* and *well-made Soop*.—This Interpretation, we preſume, will be admitted without Difficulty by thoſe who are verſed in the Writings of the *Ancient Philoſophers*. Nothing is more common with Them, than to compare Man not governed by Reaſon, in his *Concupiſcible* Affections, to *Cattle*, τοῖς βοσκήμασι, and in his *Iraſcible*, to *Wild Beaſts*, τοῖς θηρίοις. The Metaphor of the *Lyre* is uſed exactly in the ſame Senſe, as it is here, by *Plato* in his *Phædo*, p. 85, 86. and frequently by the *Platoniſts* in Imitation of their Maſter. See in particular *Porphyry*, Ἀφορμ. §. 19. Me-

SOCRATES.

Such is the Man, Hippias; not nice and delicate; but a mean ſhabby Fellow, without Conſideration or Regard for Aught except This, in every Inquiry,—What is True.—The Man, however, muſt have an Anſwer: and in order to it, I thus premiſe — If the Pan be made by a Good Workman, ſmooth, and round, and well-baked; like ſome of our handſome Soop-Pans with two Handles, thoſe which hold ſix [47] Coas, exceedingly beautiful in truth; if he mean ſuch a Pan as Theſe are, the Pan muſt be confeſſed Beautiful. For how indeed could we deny That to be beautiful, which has real Beauty?

HIPPIAS.

By no Means, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Is not a beautiful Soop-Pan then, he will ſay, a Thing Beautiful? Anſwer.

HIPPIAS.

taphors of near Affinity with that of the *Pan*, χύτρα, to illuſtrate the ſame Thing which is here meant by it, are often uſed by the *Stoicks* and Thoſe who borrowed from Them; ſuch as ἄστος, ἄγγειον, θύλακος, ξέστης by way of Diminutive, *&c.* The very ſame Word, χύτρα, in *Epictet. Ench.* C. 3. Edit. *Upton.* (but in the common Editions, Cap. 8.) has probably a Reference to the ſame Metaphorical Meaning. This will make a great Propriety in the Application of the Verb ςέργειν there to χύτρα, which, otherwiſe, juſtly ſeems ſtrange to the late judicious Editor of that Book, *Dr. Simpſon.* That whole Chapter receives, we think, an additional Beauty from being ſeen in ſuch a Light.

[47] According to the accurate *Dr. Arbuthnot*'s Computation, the *Attic* χοῦς or χόα was a Meaſure containing three Quarts. So that the fine Tourenes, here mentioned, held 4 ½ Gallons.

HIPPIAS.

Well then, Socrates; My Opinion of the Caſe is this: Even this Veſſel, if well and handſomely made, is a beautiful Thing likewiſe. But Nothing of this Kind deſerves to be mentioned as Beautiful, when we are ſpeaking of a Mare, and a Maiden, or any other Thing thus admirable for its Beauty.

SOCRATES.

So; now I apprehend you, Hippias; when the Man aſks ſuch a Queſtion as that, we are thus, it ſeems, to anſwer him:—Honeſt Man! Are you ignorant how it was ſaid well by Heraclitus, "that the moſt beautiful Ape, in Compari-"ſon with the [48] Human Kind, is a Creature far from beau-"tiful?" Juſt ſo, the moſt beautiful Soop-Pan is a Thing far from beautiful in Compariſon with the Maiden-Kind; as it is ſaid by Hippias the Wiſe.—Is it not thus, Hippias, that we muſt anſwer?

[48] In the *Greek* we read ἄλλῳ γένει. But, that we ought to read ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει, there is no Occaſion, we preſume, for any Arguments to prove. It will ſufficiently appear from what is quoted preſently after from the ſame *Heraclitus*. For however *dark* or *myſterious* his Writings might have been, as we are told they were, yet there is no Reaſon to think he wrote *abſurdly*. But the Abſurdity was eaſily committed by the *Tranſcribers* of *Plato*; who probably ſometimes did not well underſtand his Meaning, certainly were not always very attentive to it. For we learn from Thoſe who are much converſant with *ancient Manuſcripts*, that ἀνθρώπῳ often, and ἀνθρωπίνῳ ſometimes, is written in this conciſe manner, ἀνῳ. And no Error is more common in the Editions of *Greek Authors*, than ſuch as are occaſioned by this very Abbreviation.

HIPPIAS.

By all Means, Socrates: your Anſwer is perfectly right.

SOCRATES.

Mind me now: for upon This, I am well aſſured, He will ſay to me thus; "But ſuppoſe, Socrates, the Maiden-"Kind were to be ſet in Compariſon with the Goddeſs-"Kind; would not the ſame Accident befall the Maidens "in that Caſe, which happened to the Soop-Pans com-"pared with Them? Would not the faireſt Maiden appear "far from being beautiful? Does not Heraclitus farther "teach this very Doctrine, [49] which You your ſelf muſt needs "infer

[49] The *Greek* is thus printed, ὃν σὺ ἐπάγῃ; and by all the Tranſlators interpreted after this manner, "*That Heraclitus, whoſe Teſtimony you* "*cite:*" as if the Word μάρτυρα was tacitly underſtood after ἐπάγῃ. Whether this Interpretation be agreeable to the Words of *Plato*, or not; we ſee it plainly repugnant to the Matter of Fact: for it was not *Hippias*, but *Socrates* himſelf, who had juſt before cited *Heraclitus*. Suppoſing, however, that the Writings of this Philoſopher were cited frequently by *Hippias*; and that poſſibly therefore the Meaning might be this, "*He, whoſe Teſtimony you are uſed to cite;*" yet the Alteration of the Word ὃν into Ὃ ΑΝ will, we preſume, to every *attentive* and *judicious* Reader appear to make better Senſe and Reaſoning. For the Saying of *Heraclitus*, which follows, as this Philoſopher *inferred* the Truth of it, by Analogy, from his Compariſon between *Apes* and *Men*; is no leſs a proper *Inference*, in the ſame Way of Reaſoning, from what *Hippias* had juſt before admitted to be his own Meaning, and the Amount of what he had ſaid concerning the *Soop-Pan* compared with a beautiful *Maiden*. Our *learned* Readers will alſo obſerve the Conſtruction to be much eaſier, and more natural, when the Sentence is read thus; Ὃ δ' καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ταυτὸν τοῦτο λέγει, ὃ ἂν σὺ ἐπάγῃ.

" infer to be true ;—that [50] the Wiſeſt of Men, compared " with a God, will appear an Ape in Wiſdom and Beauty " and every other Excellence ?"—Shall we own, Hippias, the faireſt Maiden far from beautiful in Compariſon with a Goddeſs ?

HIPPIAS.

Who, Socrates, would preſume to call This in queſtion ?

SOCRATES.

No ſooner then ſhall I have agreed with him in This, than He will laugh at me, and ſay, " Do you remember, So- " crates, what Queſtion you was aſked ?" I do, I ſhall tell him ; it was This ; " What Kind of Thing was the Beautifull " its Self ?" " When the Queſtion then, he will ſay, con- " cerned the Beautifull its Self, your Anſwer was concern- " ing That which happens to be far from beautiful, accord- " ing to your own Confeſſion, as beautiful as it is." " So " it

[50] In this Quotation from *Heraclitus* Every one will diſcern the Original of that Thought in Mr. *Pope*'s *Eſſay* on Man,

Superior Beings, when of late they ſaw
A Mortal Man unfold all Nature's Law,
Admir'd ſuch Wiſdom in an Earthly Shape,
And ſhow'd a Newton, *as We ſhow an Ape.*

There is, however, we imagine, ſome Difference in the Application. For the Meaning of *Heraclitus*, if *Plato* introduced him at all to the *main Purpoſe* of his Dialogue, was to inſinuate, that Reaſonings and Rules meerly human, that is, ſuch as were not true and good eternally, were but Apiſh and ridiculous Imitations of Right Reaſoning and True Law, which are purely of Divine Original.

"' it ſeems,"—ſhall I ſay? or what other Reply, my Friend, do you adviſe me to make him?

HIPPIAS.

I think, for My Part, you muſt reply in thoſe very Words. [51] For, when he ſays, that the Human Kind, compared with the Divine, is far from beautiful, without Doubt he will have the Truth on his Side.

SOCRATES.

But were I to have aſked you at firſt This Queſtion, will he ſay, " What is beautiful, and [52] at the ſame time Far from beautiful;" and You were to have anſwered me in the Manner you did; would not you in that Caſe have anſwered rightly? And does the Beautifull then its Self, by which every Other Thing is ornamented, and looks beautiful, whenever this Form of Beauty ſupervenes and inveſts it, imparting thus the Virtue of its Preſence, does This ſtill appear to you to be a Maiden, or a Mare, or a Lyre?

HIPPIAS.

[51] We intirely agree with Monſ. *Maucroy*, in aſſigning the following Sentence to *Hippias*; tho all the other Tranſlations, with the printed Editions of the *Greek*, attribute it to *Socrates*. The Error ſeems to have ariſen from want of obſerving, that the *Particle* καὶ in *Plato* has frequently the Force of γὰρ; and that καὶ δὴ, tho oftner καὶ μὲν δὴ, anſwers to the *Latin* " *enimverò*."

[52] This refers to that *Duplicity* of the *Human Soul*, mentioned in Note 34. The *Pythagoreans* and *Platoniſts*, in deſcribing Human Nature, preſent us often with the View of thoſe *two different Principles* in Man at the ſame time, the *Divine*, and the meerly *Animal*; by inclining to one or other of which he reſembles either a *Deity* or a *Brute*: ἀμφίσβιος τις ὢν, ſays *Hierocles*, καὶ μεσότης τῶν ἄκρων διεσηκότων. Com. in A. C. ad ℣. 52. See likewiſe Lord *Shaftſb.* vol. 1. p. 184, 195.

HIPPIAS.

Truly, Socrates, if This be the Queſtion which he aſks, it is the eaſieſt thing imaginable to anſwer it; and to tell him, What that beautiful Thing is, by which other Things are ornamented; and which, by ſupervening and inveſting them, makes them look beautiful. So that He muſt be a very ſimple Fellow, and intirely a Stranger to Things elegant and fine. For if you only anſwer him thus, "that "the Beautifull, which He inquires after, is nothing elſe "than Gold," he will have no more to ſay, nor attempt ever to refute Such an Anſwer. Becauſe None of us can be inſenſible, that, wherever Gold be applied or ſuperinduced, let the Thing have looked ever ſo vile and ſordid before, yet then it will look beautiful, when 'tis inveſted or ornamented with Gold.

SOCRATES.

You have no Experience of the Man, Hippias; how unyielding he is, and how hard in admitting any Aſſertion.

HIPPIAS.

What ſignifys That, Socrates? he muſt of Neceſſity admit what is rightly aſſerted; or, in not admitting it, expoſe himſelf to Ridicule.

SOCRATES.

And yet will He be ſo far from admitting this Anſwer, my Friend, that he will treat Me with open Deriſion, and ſay to me, "You that are ſo puffed up with the Opinion of "your own Skill and Knowlege, do you think Phidias was a

" Bad Workman ? " — And I believe I ſhall anſwer, that he was far from being ſo.

HIPPIAS.

You will anſwer rightly, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Rightly, without Diſpute. But He, when I have agreed with him that Phidias was a good Workman, will ſay, " Do " you imagine then, that Phidias was ignorant of That " which you call the Beautifull ? " — " To what Purpoſe " do you aſk This ? " I ſhall ſay. — " Becauſe Minerva's " Eyes, will He reply, Phidias made not of Gold, nor yet " the reſt of her Face ; nor the Feet, nor the Hands nei- " ther : tho ſhe would have looked handſomeſt, it ſeems, " had ſhe been a Golden Goddeſs : but he made [53] Theſe all " of Ivory. 'Tis evident, that he committed this Error " thro Ignorance ; not knowing, that Gold it was, which " beautified all things, wherever it was applied." — When he talks after this Manner, what Anſwer ſhall we make him, Hippias ?

HIPPIAS.

[53] All the other Parts, not here mentioned, were of maſſive Gold : as we collect from *Pliny*'s *Natural Hiſtory*, L. 36. C. 6. compared with this Place. For the *Athenian Minerva* was always painted or carved with *Martial Habiliments*. It became a *Goddeſs* to have Theſe made of *Gold*. And with equal Propriety, no Doubt, did *Phidias* make of *Ivory* the Parts ſuppoſed to be left *naked*. The *Olympian Jupiter*, and *This* admirable Statue, the Size of which far exceeded the Human, were eſteemed the Capital Works of that Great Maſter. See *Plin.* Hiſt. Nat. L. 34. C. 8. The *Minerva* ſtood in the Παρθενὼν, or Temple of that Goddeſs, at *Athens*.

HIPPIAS.

There is no Difficulty at all in the Matter. We ſhall anſwer, " Phidias was in the Right; for Things made of " Ivory are alſo, as I preſume, Beautiful."

SOCRATES.

" What was the Reaſon then, will He ſay, why Phidias " made not the Pupil of the Eyes out of Ivory, but [54] out " of Stone rather? chuſing for that Purpoſe ſuch Stone, as " [in Colour] moſt reſembled Ivory. Is a beautiful Stone " then a Thing beautiful too?" — Shall we admit it ſo to be, Hippias?

HIPPIAS.

We will; in a Place where the Stone is Becoming.

SOCRATES.

But where it is Unbecoming, ſhall I allow it to be Unhandſome, or not?

HIPPIAS.

Allow it; where the Stone becomes not the Place.

SOCRATES.

54 This ſeems to have been very judicious in the Statuary. For *Stone*, not being ſo ſmooth in itſelf, nor capable of ſo high a Poliſh as *Ivory*, abſorbs the Rays of Light more; and conſequently, we ſhould imagine, muſt give the Pupils of the Eyes, amidſt the Ivory round them, a Look leſs flat and dead, and more reſembling Life. The Words in the Parentheſis we have added by way of Explanation. But the whole of this Note we ſubmit to the Judgment of thoſe excellent Statuarys among Us, who in After-times will be deemed to have done the Preſent Age ſo much Honour.

SOCRATES.

" Well now; and is it not the Same with Ivory and Gold, " You Wiſe Man you?" will He ſay. " Do not Theſe, " where they are Becoming, make Things appear Hand- " ſome; but far otherwiſe, where they are Unbecoming?" Shall we deny this, or acknowlege the Man to be in the Right?

HIPPIAS.

We muſt acknowlege This, that Whatever is Becoming to any thing, makes it appear Handſome.

SOCRATES.

Upon this, He will ſay thus: " When that fine Soop-Pan " then, which we have been ſpeaking of, is ſet upon the Stove, " full of [55] excellent Soop; whether is a Golden Spoon the " moſt becoming and proper for it, or a Sycamore Spoon?"

HIPPIAS.

Hercules! What a ſtrange Sort of Man, Socrates, is He whom you are talking of! Will you not tell me, Who he is?

SOCRATES.

[55] The fine compound Soops of the *Athenians*, to prevent ſpoiling the Contexture of Some of the Ingredients, and confounding the Order of Others, were, many of them, ſerved up to Table in the very Stew-ing-Pans, in which they were made. See *Ariſtoph. Eq.* Act. 4. Sc. 1. *Athenæus*, L. 9. pag. 406. and *Caſaubon.* in *Athen.* pag. 693. For this Reaſon that elegant People was very curious about the Beauty of theſe Pans or Diſhes. The Matter of them ſeems to have been a Kind of Porcelain, and the Form not unlike our Tourenes. If the Curioſity of any of our Readers ſhould lead them to inquire into the Compoſition of theſe Soops, they may ſatisfy it in ſome meaſure by looking into *Athe-næus*, and *Apicius Cælius*, L. 5. C. 3.

SOCRATES.

Should I tell you his Name, You would not know him.

HIPPIAS.

But I know already, that he is ſome ignorant ſilly Fellow.

SOCRATES.

He is a very troubleſome Queſtioner indeed, Hippias. But however, what ſhall We anſwer? Which of the two Spoons ſhall we ſay is moſt becoming and proper for the Soop and for the Pan? Is it not clearly the [56] Sycamore Spoon? For This gives a better Scent and Flavour to the Soop; and at the ſame time, my Friend, it would not break the Pan, and ſpill the Soop, and put out the Fire, and when the Gueſts were come prepared for feaſting, rob

[56] In the *Greek* συκίνη. But that we ought to read συκαμίνη, there is great Reaſon to ſuſpect. For the Wood of the Fig-Tree was found ſo unfit a Material in the making any domeſtic Utenſils, *&c.* that the *Grecians* in common Speech metaphorically called whatever was uſeleſs, σύκινον, *a Fig-Tree Thing*, This or That. Upon which Account *Horace* gives that Wood the Epithet of "*Inutile*," L. 1. Sat. 8.—Whereas the Wood of the Sycamore-Tree, συκάμινος, is by *Theophraſtus* ſaid to be ξύλον—πρὸς πολλὰ χρήσιμον, *Hiſt. Plant.* L. 4. C. 2 Not to inſiſt on the extream Bitterneſs of Fig-Tree-Wood to the Taſt; and the Offenſiveneſs of its Smoak, when burning, beyond that of any other Tree: (ſee *Plutarch*, vol. 2. p. 684.) Qualitys, which ſeem to indicate the Scent and Flavour of it not to be very agreeable. The Alteration of this Word is eaſily accounted for. The συκάμινος, or συκόμορος, being the ſame with the συκῆ Αἰγύπτια, 'tis probable that the *Alexandrian Platoniſts*, to illuſtrate the Word συκαμίνη, wrote in the Margin of their Books συκίνη: which afterwards the more eaſily took Place of the Other, becauſe the Fig-Tree was well known to be the moſt common of any Tree in *Attica*.

them of an excellent Diſh. But all theſe Miſchiefs would be done by that Golden Spoon. We muſt, I think therefore, anſwer, that the Sycamore Spoon is more becoming and proper in this Caſe than the Golden Spoon: unleſs You ſay otherwiſe.

HIPPIAS.

Well, Socrates; more becoming and proper be it then: but, for My Part, I would not hold Diſcourſe with a Fellow, who aſked ſuch Sort of Queſtions.

SOCRATES.

Right, my dear Friend. For it would not be Becoming or Proper for You, to be beſpattered with ſuch vile dirty Words, [57] ſo finely dreſſed as you are from Top to Toe, and ſo illuſtrious for Wiſdom through all Greece. But for Me—'tis Nothing to [58] dirty my ſelf againſt the Man. Give me my Leſſon therefore, what I am to ſay; and anſwer in My Name. For the Man now will ſay thus; "If the Sycamore Spoon then be more Becoming and Proper than the Golden one, muſt it not be Handſomer?"

HIPPIAS.

[57] The fine Dreſs, in which *Hippias* appeared at the Olympic Games, is related by *Plato* in the leſſer Dialogue of His Name; and more at large, by *Apuleius*, Florid. Lib. 2. *Ælian* alſo tells us, that the ordinary Attire of that Sophiſt, whenever he appeared abroad, was of a Scarlet Colour, ſuch as in thoſe Days peculiarly belonged to Perſons of high Dignity, *Var. Hiſt.* L. 12. C. 32.

[58] Meaning, that he was accuſtomed to ſubmit his Fancys and Paſſions to the ſevere Diſcipline and rough Treatment of his Higher Principle.

HIPPIAS.

Since the Proper and Becoming, Socrates, you have granted to be handſomer than the Improper and Unbecoming.

SOCRATES.

What, Hippias; and ſhall we grant him too, that the Sycamore Spoon has more Beauty in it than the Golden Spoon?

HIPPIAS.

Shall I tell you, Socrates, what you ſhall ſay the Beautifull is, ſo as to prevent him from all farther cavilling and diſputing?

SOCRATES.

By all means: but not before you tell me, whether of the two Spoons, we have been talking of, is the moſt Beautiful, as well as the moſt Proper and Becoming.

HIPPIAS.

Well then; if it pleaſes You, anſwer him, "It is That "made of the Sycamore-Tree."

SOCRATES.

Now ſay what you was juſt going to ſay. For This Anſwer, in which I pronounce Gold to be the Beautifull, will be refuted; and Gold will be demonſtrated, I find, not to be at all more beautiful than Sycamore Wood. But What, ſay you, is the Beautifull, now?

HIPPIAS.

I will tell you. For when you aſk me, "What is the

"Beau-

" Beautifull," you would have me, I perceive, give you for Anſwer Something which ſhall never, in any Place, or to any Perſon, appear otherwiſe than beautiful.

SOCRATES.

By all means, Hippias. And now you apprehend me perfectly well. [59] But obſerve what I ſay: be aſſured, that if any Man ſhall be able to controvert our new Anſwer, I ſhall vow never more to praiſe any thing for its Beauty. Now in the Name of the Gods proceed, and tell it me without Delay.

HIPPIAS.

I ſay then, that Always, and to every Perſon, and in every Place, it will appear the moſt beautiful, lovely, and deſirable Thing in the World, to be Rich, Healthy, Honoured by his Country, to arrive at a good old Age, to give his Parents an honourable Burial, and at length to have the laſt

[59] In Conformity with all the Editions of the *Greek*, and the Tranſlations of *Grynæus* and *Serranus*, we have aſcribed the following Words, ending with "*any more*," to *Socrates*; in a Senſe agreeable to what he has before ſaid in Page 45, and alſo to his concluding Speech at the End of this Dialogue.—*Ficinus* and *Bembo* in Their Tranſlations, and *H. Stephens* in his Notes, parcel out the Sentence, and aſſign Thoſe Words to *Hippias*; putting a Senſe on them, not quite ſo natural, as we apprehend, nor ſo appoſite to the Purpoſe.—*Cornarius* indeed, followed by Monſ. *Maucroy*, gives them a Senſe humorous enough, and agreeable to the Character of *Hippias*; but, in ſo doing is obliged to alter the Word ἐπαινεῖν into ἐπαΐειν. If any Manuſcript favoured this Alteration, we ſhould be inclined to adopt it, tranſlating the Paſſage thus: HIPP. "*Hear me then; and if any Man can object Aught againſt what I am going to ſay, I ſhall own that I know Nothing.*".

laſt Offices performed for himſelf honourably and magnificently by his own Iſſue.

SOCRATES.

O Brave! O Rare! how admirable, how great, and how worthy of your Self, Hippias, is the Speech, you have now ſpoken! By Juno, I receive with much Pleaſure that hearty Willingneſs of yours to give me all the Aſſiſtance in Your Power. But we reach not the Point yet. For now will the Man laugh at us more than ever, you may be aſſured.

HIPPIAS.

An ill-timed Laugh, Socrates. For in laughing, when he has nothing to object, he will in Reality laugh only at Himſelf; and be the Ridicule of All, who happen to be preſent.

SOCRATES.

Perhaps ſo. But perhaps alſo, as ſoon as I have thus anſwered, I ſhall be in Danger, if I propheſy aright, of ſomething beſides the being laught at.

HIPPIAS.

What beſides?

SOCRATES.

That, if he happens to have a Cane in his Hand, unleſs I run away and eſcape him, he will aim ſome very ſerious Strokes at me.

HIPPIAS.

How ſay you? What, is the Man ſome Maſter of yours then? for otherwiſe, would he not be puniſhed for the Injury done you? or is there no Juſtice in Your City? but the

the Citizens are permitted to aſſault and beat one another injuriouſly.

SOCRATES.

By no Means are they permitted to do any ſuch Thing.

HIPPIAS.

Will he not therefore be condemned to Puniſhment, as having beat you injuriouſly?

SOCRATES.

I ſhould think he would not, Hippias; not having beat me injuriouſly, if I had made him ſuch an Anſwer; but very deſervedly, as it ſeems to Me.

HIPPIAS.

It ſeems ſo then to Me, Socrates; if You are of that Opinion, your Self.

SOCRATES.

Shall I tell you, why, in my own Opinion, I ſhould have deſerved a Beating, if I had ſo anſwered?—Will You condemn me too without trying the Cauſe? or will you hear what I have to ſay?

HIPPIAS.

'Twould be a hard Caſe indeed, Socrates, ſhould I deny you a Hearing. But What have you to ſay then?

SOCRATES.

I will tell you; but in the ſame Way, as I talked with you juſt now, aſſuming his Character, whilſt You perſonate Me. I ſhall do this, to avoid treating you in your own Perſon with ſuch Language, as He will uſe in reprimanding

manding Me, with harſh and out-of-the-way Terms. For I aſſure you, that He will ſay thus: —" Tell me, Socrates; " think you not, that you deſerve a Beating, for having " ſung that Pompous Strain, ſo foreign to the Deſign of " the Muſick; ſpoiling thus the Harmony, and wander- " ing wide of the Point propoſed to you? "—" How ſo?" I ſhall aſk him. — " How? he will reply: Can you not " remember, that I aſked you concerning the Beautifull it- " ſelf, That which makes every Thing beautiful, wherever " it comes and imparts the Virtue of its Preſence; whe- " ther it communicates it to Stone or Wood, to Man or " God, to Actions and Manners, or to any Part of Science. " Beauty itſelf, Man, I aſk you, What it is: and I can no " more beat it into your Head what I ſay, than if you " were a Stone lying by my Side, nay a Mill-Stone too, " without Ears or Brains." Now, Hippias, would not You be angry with me, if I, frightened with this Reprimand, ſhould ſay to him thus: — " Why, Hippias ſaid, this was " the Beautifull; and I aſked him, juſt as You aſk Me, " what was Beautiful to all Perſons, and at all Times."— What ſay you? Will you not be angry, if I tell him thus?

HIPPIAS.

That which I deſcribed, Socrates, is beautiful, I am very poſitive, in the Eyes of All Men [60].

SOCRATES.

[60] At the End of this Sentence, in the *Greek*, are added the Words, καὶ δόξει. Theſe we have omitted to tranſlate; on a Preſumption, that they were at firſt but a Marginal various Reading of the Words which

SOCRATES.

" And always Will it be ſo? he will ſay: for the Beau-
" full itſelf muſt be Always beautiful."

HIPPIAS.

To be ſure.

SOCRATES.

" And always Was it ſo in former Times?" he will ſay.

HIPPIAS.

It always Was ſo.

SOCRATES.

" What; and to [61] Achilles too, he will ſay, did
" the Elean Stranger affirm 'twas a beautiful and deſirable
" Thing to ſurvive his Progenitors? and that 'twas the
" ſame to his Grandfather Æacus, and the reſt of Thoſe,
" who

follow, καὶ ἔτι, ſpoken by *Socrates*. For the Difference between *Real* and *Apparent* Beauty falls not under Conſideration in this Part of the Argument.

[61] *Achilles* was the reputed Son of the Goddeſs *Thetis*; and *Æacus*, of *Jupiter* himſelf. But the Suppoſition, that *Achilles* and *Æacus* ſurvived their Parents, would have transformed thoſe Deitys into meer Mortals; and conſequently would have greatly derogated from the Honour of their Iſſue, and have diminiſhed that Felicity which theſe Heroes were thought to have attained. — But beſides this, in the Caſe of *Achilles*, the Height of his Glory aroſe from his Choice of a ſhort Life, full of generous Sentiments and heroic Actions, to be completed before the Death of his Father *Peleus*. The Intention of *Plato* in this Paſſage is to ſhew, that there is no Scheme of Happineſs, meerly Human, conſiſtent and always the Same; but that the outward Condition of Life, deſirable, varys with the various Circumſtances of Perſons and of Things.

" who were the Progeny of the Gods? nay, that 'twas ſo
" even to the Gods themſelves?"

HIPPIAS.

What a Fellow is this! [62] Away with him. Such Queſtions as theſe are profane, and improper to be aſked.

SOCRATES.

But is it not much more profane for any Man, when theſe Queſtions are aſked him, to anſwer in the Affirmative, and to maintain ſuch Propoſitions?

HIPPIAS.

Perhaps it is.

SOCRATES.

" Perhaps then You are this Man, will he ſay; who
" affirm it to be a Thing always, and to every Perſon,

 " beau-

[62] The *Greek* is, *βάλλ' ἐς μαχαρίαν*. Various Explications of this Proverb are given us by *Timæus* (in *Lexic. Platonic.*) *Heſychius*, *Suidas*, and Others. But to Us None of them are ſatisfactory. *Eraſmus*, with his uſual Acuteneſs and Sagacity, was the Firſt, ſo far as We know, who diſcovered the moſt probable Origin of it: tho with his uſual Socratic Modeſty he only ſays, it ſeems to be ſo; and after the Accounts uſually given of it, offers his own, which is This: that the particular Spot of Ground, where a great Part of the *Perſian* Forces periſhed in the Battle of *Marathon*, a deep Marſh in which they ſunk and were overwhelmed, being, as he obſerves from *Pauſanias*, called Μαχαρία, the *Grecians* uſed this Proverbial Speech by way of Deteſtation, when they curſed any Man; *Throw him into* Macaria; (*the Place, where our deteſted Enemys lye periſhed.*) See *Eraſm. Adag.* Chil. 2. Cent. 1. N. 98. *Schottus* gives the ſame Interpretation, in the very Words of *Eraſmus*; but, like many other learned Commentators, without acknowleging his Author, *Schol.* in *Zenobium*, p. 42.

" beautiful and deſirable, to be buried by his Deſcendants,
" and to bury his Parents. Was not Hercules One of theſe
" Every Perſons? and Thoſe whom we juſt now mention-
" ed, are not They alſo to be included in the Number?"

HIPPIAS.

But I did not affirm it was ſo to [63] the Gods.

SOCRATES.

Nor to the Heroes, I preſume.

HIPPIAS.

Not to Such, as were Children of the Gods.

SOCRATES.

But to Such only, as were not ſo.

HIPPIAS.

Right.

SOCRATES.

Amongſt the Number of Heroes then, it ſeems, according to Your Account, to [64] Tantalus, and Dardanus, and Zethus,

[63] *Hercules* was the only one of the Heroes, except *Bacchus*, who, according to the Pagan Syſtem of Theology, was advanced after his Death, on Account of his ſuperior Virtue, to Divinity itſelf. To *Hippias* therefore, *Hercules* is the ſtrongeſt Inſtance that could be given, to prove the Impiety of what He had aſſerted.

[64] In the Opinion of the Vulgar, theſe Three were Heroes and Sons of *Jupiter*, no leſs than were *Æacus* and *Hercules*; tho in Point of Merit they were far inferior. For the Greatneſs of theſe *Popular Heroes* was meerly Popular and External, devoid of true Virtue. The Lives of *Dardanus* the Firſt King of *Troy*, and of *Zethus* the Co-Founder of *Thebes*, were not illuſtrious for any Great and Heroic Actions; and that of *Tantalus* was ſtained with an unnatural and enormous Crime, the Murder

Zethus, it would have been a ſad Thing, a horrible Profanation of Deity to ſuppoſe it, and a fatal Blow to their own Honour; but to Pelops, and Others born of Men like Him, it was a glorious Thing, beautiful, and deſirable.

HIPPIAS.

So I think it to be.

SOCRATES.

" You think This then to be true, the Contrary of " which You maintained juſt now, will he ſay, that to ſur- " vive their Anceſtors, and to be buried by their Deſcen- " dants, is, in Some [65] Caſes, and to Some [66] Perſons, a " diſhonourable and a horrible Thing: nay more, it ſeems " not poſſible that ſuch a Thing ſhould be, or ever become, " beau-

Murder of his own Son, *Pelops*. On the Contrary, the whole Life of *Hercules* was devoted to the Service of Mankind, in the freeing them from the lawleſs Violence of Robbers and Oppreſſors, ſignified under the Fables of Monſters laying waſt the whole Country. And as to the Other, *Æacus*, he was ſo famed for the Juſtice and Equity of his Government, that he was ſuppoſed a fit Perſon to be aſſociated with *Minos* and *Rhadamanthus*, in the Tribunal of Juſtice, for determining the State of all Men after Death: by *Plato* in his *Apology*, or Defence of *Socrates*, he is numbered amongſt the Demi-Gods; and by the Oracle of *Apollo*, cited in *Porphyry*'s *Life of Plotinus*, he is called the *Righteous Æacus*. In this particular Paſſage therefore, not only *Hippias*, but the Vulgar Religion, which confounded Good and Evil, is humorouſly ridiculed: and at the ſame time, by preſenting to the Mind the Remembrance of different Heroes, Some falſely ſo called, and Others of the *Genuine* Kind, the Life, ſo highly extolled by *Hippias*, is ſet in Contraſt with the Life truly *Heroic* and truly *Happy*.

[65] Meaning the Caſe of *Achilles*.

[66] That is, to the *Heroes*.

" beautiful and desirable to [67] All. So that This, which " you now hold to be the Beautifull, happens to be in the " same Case with those your former Favorites, the Maiden " and the [68] Gold; sometimes it is beautiful, and some- " times otherwise: but a Circumstance still more ridicu- " lous attends This; it is beautiful only to Some Persons, " whilst to Others it is quite the Contrary. And not yet, " will he say, not all this Day long, are you able, Socrates, " to answer the Question which you were asked — What " the Beautifull is."— In Terms such as These will He reproach me justly, should I answer him as You directed me. — Much after the Manner, Hippias, which I have now represented to you, proceed the Conversations usually held between the Man and Me [69]. But now and then, as if

[67] That is, to the *Gods*, Immortal and Immutable. But Those, who are truly acquainted with *Plato*, will perceive, that his Drift, in all this Part of the Dialogue, is to insinuate, that Men of Heroic Souls, like *Achilles*, or of Godlike Minds, like *Æacus*, or of Divine Virtue, like *Hercules*, place not their Supreme Good, where *Hippias* did, in the Gifts of Fortune; but in that which is *Invariable* and to be found *within Themselves*, That, which is the Subject of this whole Dialogue.

[68] The *Greek* here, by a most absurd Corruption of the Text, is printed χύτρα, instead of χρυσὸς: a Corruption, admitted and followed by all the Translators. One would imagine, that the *Minds* of them all, as well as of the Printers and old Transcribers, were wholly *in the Soop-Pan*.

[69] Meaning, that his Divine Genius usually acted only a *Negative* Part, *opposing* and *combating* the Suggestions of his Fancy, in every Case where he was in Danger of being led by This into *false* Opinions, or *bad* Actions. (See *Plato's Theages*.) However, that sometimes,

if in Pity to my Ignorance and Want of Learning, he propoſes to me Himſelf ſome Particular Matter of Inquiry; and aſks me, whether I think Such or Such a Thing to be the Beautifull; or whatever elſe be the General Subject of the Queſtion, which He has been pleaſed to put to me, or upon which the Converſation happens at that time to turn.

HIPPIAS.

How mean you, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

I will explain my Meaning to you by an Inſtance in the preſent Subject. — "Friend Socrates, ſays he, let us have "done with diſputing in this Way: give me no more An-"ſwers of this Sort; for they are very ſilly and eaſily con-"futed. But conſider now, whether the Beautifull be "Something of This Kind; Such, as in our Diſpute juſt "now we touched upon; when we ſaid, that Gold, where "it was proper and becoming, was beautiful; but other-"wiſe, where it was improper and unbecoming; and that "the Beauty of all other Things depended on the Same "Principle; that is, they were beautiful, only where they "were becoming: Now this very Thing, the Proper and "Becoming, eſſential Propriety and Decorum itſelf, ſee "whether This may not happen to be the Beautifull."

—Now,

times, tho' rarely, the ſame Superior inward Principle would *poſitively* ſuggeſt Opinions, which it was *right* to entertain; or prompt him to Actions, in which it was *good* to be engaged.

—Now, for my Part, I am uſed to give my [70] Aſſent, in Such Matters, to Every Thing propoſed to me. For I find in my Self Nothing to object. But what think You of it? are You of Opinion, that the Becoming is the Beautifull?

HIPPIAS.

Intirely am I, Socrates, of that Opinion.

SOCRATES.

Let us conſider it, however; for fear we ſhould be guilty of ſome Miſtake in this Point.

HIPPIAS.

I agree, we ought ſo to do.

SOCRATES.

Obſerve then. That which we call the Becoming, is it not either Something, whoſe Preſence, wherever it comes, giveth all things a beautiful Appearance; or Something, which gives them the Reality of Beauty; or Something, which

[70] Meaning, that his Inferior Soul was apt to catch at every Appearance of Beauty, Truth, or Good, unexamined and without Conſideration, whether preſented to it by the Senſes or by the Mind. For *Socrates*, having made that Diviſion of himſelf, mentioned in Note 34, modeſtly calls the Inferior Part, that which is meerly Human, *Himſelf*; and the Other, which is Divine, ſometimes by the Name of Δαίμων, or Middle Nature between God and Man, and ſometimes with our modern Philoſophic Poet — *the God within the Mind.* This will be a Key to many Paſſages of *Plato*, where he oppoſes Men to Gods. See farther concerning This, in our Notes on the Speech of *Socrates* in the *Banquet.*

which beſtows [71] Both, and cauſes them not only to appear beautiful, but really ſo to be?

HIPPIAS.

I think, it muſt be One or Other of theſe.

SOCRATES.

Whether of theſe then is the Becoming? Is it That, which only gives a beautiful Appearance? as a Man, whoſe Body is of a deformed Make, when he has put on Cloaths or Shoes which fit him, looks handſomer than he really is. Now if the Becoming cauſes every Thing to look handſomer than it really is, the Becoming muſt then be a Kind of Fraud or Impoſition with regard to Beauty, and cannot be That which We are in Search of, Hippias. For We were inquiring what That was, by which all beautiful Things are Beautiful. [72] As, if we were aſked what That was, by which

[71] A moſt egregious and groſs Blunder has corrupted the *Greek* Text in this Place; where we read ἑδέτερα. Inſtead of which, we ought to read ἀμφότερα: as will appear clearly in the Courſe of the Argument. Yet, groſs as the Blunder is, all the Tranſlators have given into it.

[72] In the *Greek* we read, ὥσπερ ᾧ πάντα τὰ μεγάλα ἐϛὶ μεγάλα, τῷ ὑπερέχοντι. *Stephens* in his Annotations ſays, he had rather the Word ᾧ was omitted. Parallel Places might be found in *Plato*, to juſtify in ſome Meaſure the Expreſſion, as it ſtands. But were it neceſſary to make any Alteration, we ſhould make no Doubt of ſuppoſing the Error lay in the laſt Words; nor ſcruple to read them thus, τὸ ὑπερέχον ΤΙ. For in the Sentence preſently after, where this Similitude (as to the Manner of defining) is applied, *Plato* uſes the ſame Way of expreſſing himſelf, thus; ὅτω δὴ φαμὲν καὶ τὸ καλὸν, ᾧ καλὰ πάντα ἐϛὶ,— ΤΙ ἂν εἴη.

which all great Things are Great, we ſhould anſwer [73], "it "was by Surpaſſing Other Things of the ſame Kind." For thus it is, that All Things are Great: and tho they may not All appear Great to Us, yet in as much as they ſurpaſs Others, Great of Neceſſity they muſt be. So is it, we ſay, with the Beautifull; it muſt be Something, by which Things are beautiful, whether they appear to be ſo or not. Now This cannot be the Becoming: for the Becoming cauſeth Things to appear more beautiful than they really are, according to [74] Your Account of it; concealing the Truth of Things, and not ſuffering This ever to appear. But That, which cauſeth them to be really beautiful, as I juſt now ſaid, whether they appear to be ſo or not, This 'tis Our Buſineſs to find out, and declare the Nature of it: for This it is, which is the Subject of our Search, if we are ſearching for the Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

[73] The Philoſopher intends not in this place to illuſtrate by a Similitude the Difference between Real and Apparent; for the Definition of the true Nature of any other Thing would have ſerved ſuch a Purpoſe much better: but, as Things are beſt ſhown by ſhewing at the ſame time their *Contrarys*, his Intention is to illuſtrate in that Way the Nature of the Beautifull. For in defining Magnitude, and preſenting to our Mind that Claſs of Things to which Magnitude belongs, that is, the *Infinite*, he ſhews us by this Contraſt, that Beauty belongs to the *Oppoſite* Claſs of Things; and that the Beautifull itſelf, to which every beautiful Thing oweth its Beauty, muſt be That, which *bounds* Infinitude, *meaſures* Magnitude, and *equaliſes* or *proportions* all the Parts of all Things. See *Plato* in *Phileb.* p. 24, 25, and 64, of *Stephens*'s Edition, which is That to which we always refer, in citing the Original.

[74] See the longer Speech of *Hippias* in Page 63.

HIPPIAS.

But the Becoming, Socrates, cauſeth Things both to be and to appear beautiful, by Virtue of its Preſence.

SOCRATES.

If ſo, then 'tis impoſſible for Things really beautiful, to appear otherwiſe; in as much as there is preſent with them the Cauſe of beautiful Appearance.

HIPPIAS.

Admit it impoſſible.

SOCRATES.

Shall we admit This then, Hippias, that all Laws, and Rules of Action, Manners, or Behaviour, truly beautiful, are beautiful in common Eſtimation, and appear ſo always to all Men? Or ſhall we not rather ſay quite the Reverſe, that Men are ignorant of their Beauty, and that above all Things Theſe are the Subjects of Controverſy and Contention, not only Private but Public, not only between Man and Man, but between different Communitys and Civil States [75]?

HIPPIAS.

[75] For a full Explication of this Paſſage we refer our Readers to *Plato*'s *Firſt Alcibiades*, pag. 112. *Ed. Steph.* But more particularly we recommend to their Peruſal, upon this Occaſion, a Converſation between *Socrates* and *Hippias*, related by *Xenophon* in his *Memoirs of Socrates*: becauſe it confirms the Truth of many Circumſtances in this Dialogue; and in particular, not only proves, that *Plato* drew the Character of *Hippias* ſuch as it really was; but that he attributed to *Socrates* thoſe Sentiments which were truly His. *Xenophon* introduces it thus, with his uſual Simplicity: "*I remember Socrates upon a certain*

"*Time*

HIPPIAS.

Thus indeed rather, Socrates, that in thoſe Points Men are ignorant of the Beautifull.

SOCRATES.

But this would not be the Caſe, if thoſe beautiful Things had the Appearance of Beauty, added to the Reality: And this Appearance would they have, if the Becoming were the Beautifull, and cauſed Things, as You ſay it does, both to be and to appear beautiful, beſtowing on them Real and Apparent Beauty at the ſame time. Hence it follows, that if the Becoming ſhould be That, by which Things are made truly

" *Time holding Diſcourſe with Hippias of Elis concerning the Rule or* " *Standard of Right. The Occaſion of it was this: Hippias, on his Ar-* " *rival at Athens, where he had not been for a long Time before, hap-* " *pened to meet Socrates, at a Time when he was in Conference with ſome* " *other Perſons,* &c." The whole Converſation is too long to be here inſerted. But the following Paſſage in it agrees with and illuſtrates this of *Plato* now before us. It follows a Boaſt made by *Hippias*, that *concerning the Rule, by which to judge of Right and Wrong, he had ſome new Things to deliver, which it was impoſſible for Socrates or any other Perſon ever to controvert.* Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ἔφη, μέγα λέγεις ἀγαθὸν εὑρηκέναι, εἰ παύσονται μὲν οἱ δικασαὶ δίχα ψηφιζόμενοι, παύσονται δ' οἱ πολῖται περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἀντιλέγοντές τε καὶ ἀντιδικοῦντες καὶ ϛασιάζοντες, παύσονται δ' αἱ πόλεις διαφερομέναι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πολεμοῦσαι. *By Juno, ſaid Socrates, the Diſcovery, which you talk of having made, will be of great Service to the World, if it will put an End to all Diverſity of Opinions amongſt the Judges concerning What is agreeable to Juſtice: if there ſhall be no more Controverſys, nor Suits at Law, nor Factions among the Citizens concerning what is Right and What is Wrong; nor any more Differences or Wars between the Citys, occaſioned by thoſe very Queſtions.* Ξενοφ. Ἀπομνημ. βιβ. δ'.

truly beautiful, then the Becoming muſt be the Beautifull which We are in Search of, not That by which Things are only made beautiful in Appearance. But if the Becoming ſhould be That, by which Things are made beautiful only in Appearance, it cannot be the Beautifull which we are in Search of; for This beſtows the Reality of Beauty. Nor is it in the Power of the Same Thing to cauſe the Appearance and the Reality, Both, not only in the Caſe of Beauty, but [76] neither in any other Inſtance whatever. Let us chuſe now, whether of theſe Two we ſhall take for the Becoming, That which cauſes the Appearance of Beauty, or That which cauſes the Reality.

HIPPIAS.

The Becoming, Socrates, I take it, muſt be That which cauſes the Appearance.

SOCRATES.

Fie upon it! Hippias. Our Diſcovery of the Beautifull is fled away, and hath eſcaped us. For the Becoming has turned out to be a Thing different from the Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

So it ſeems; and very unaccountably too.

SOCRATES.

[76] Here again we are led to that Univerſal Principle in the Nature of Things, from which they derive their *Stability*; a Principle congenial with *Reaſon:* and are taught to diſtinguiſh it from the Oppoſite Principle in Nature, thro which the Appearance of Things continually is *varying*; a Principle congenial with *Fancy*, Both being *Infinite*. Here we may diſcover the Source of that Difference between Real and Apparent: and thus our Steps are alſo conducted farther on, towards a Diſcovery of the truly Beautifull.

SOCRATES.

But however, my Friend, we muſt not give it up for loſt. I have ſtill ſome Hope left, that the Nature of the Beautifull may come forth into Light, and ſhew itſelf.

HIPPIAS.

With great Clearneſs, Socrates, beyond Doubt: for it is by no means difficult to find. I am poſitive, that, if I were to go aſide for a little while, and conſider by my Self, I ſhould deſcribe it to you with an Accuracy beyond that of any thing ever ſo accurate.

SOCRATES.

Ah! talk not, Hippias, in ſo high a Tone. You ſee what Trouble it has given us already; and I fear it ſhould grow angry with us, and [77] run away ſtill farther than before. — But I talk idly: for You, I preſume, will eaſily find it out, when you come to be alone. Yet in the Name of the Gods I conjure you, make the Diſcovery while I am with you: and, if it be agreeable to you, admit Me, as you did before, your Companion in the Search. If we find it together, 'twill be beſt of all: and, if we miſs it in this Way of Joint Inquiry, I ſhall be contented, I hope, with my Diſappointment, and You will depart and find better Succeſs without any Difficulty. Beſides, if we now find it, I ſhall not, you know, be troubleſome afterwards, teizing you to tell me, what was the Event of that Inquiry by your Self,

[77] As much as to ſay, "Reaſon and Truth are baniſhed afar off by "raſh Arrogance and blind Poſitiveneſs."

Self, and what was the Great Diſcovery which you had made. Now therefore conſider, if you think This to be the Beautifull.—I ſay then, that it is—But pray obſerve, and give me all your Attention, for fear I ſhould ſay any thing fooliſh or foreign to the Purpoſe :— Let This then be in our Account the Beautifull, That which is Uſeful.—I was induced to think it might be ſo by theſe Conſiderations. Beautiful, we ſay, are Eyes ; not thoſe, which look as if they had not the Faculty of Sight ; but Such, as appear to have that Faculty ſtrong, and to be Uſeful for the Purpoſe of Seeing. Do we not ?

HIPPIAS.

We do.

SOCRATES.

And the Whole Body alſo, do we not call it Beautiful with a View to its Utility ; One for the Race, Another for Wreſtling ? So farther, thro all the Animal Kind, as a beautiful Horſe, Cock, and Quail : in the ſame manner all Sorts of Domeſtic Utenſils, and all the Conveniencys for Carriage abroad, be they Land-Vehicles, or Ships and Barges for the Sea : Inſtruments of Muſick likewiſe, with the Tools and Inſtruments ſubſervient to the Other Arts : to theſe you may pleaſe to add Moral Rules, and Laws : Every thing almoſt of any of theſe Kinds we call Beautiful upon the ſame Account ; reſpecting the End for which it was born, or framed, or inſtituted. In whatever Way it be uſeful, to whatever Purpoſe, and upon whatever Occaſion ; agree-

ably

ably to Theſe Circumſtances we pronounce it Beautiful. But That, which is in every Reſpect uſeleſs, we declare totally void of Beauty. Are not You of this Opinion, Hippias?

HIPPIAS.

I am.

SOCRATES.

We are right therefore now in ſaying, that above all things the Uſeful proves to be the Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

Moſt certainly right, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Now That, which is able to operate or effect any thing, is it not Uſeful ſo far as it has Power, and is Able? But That, which is Powerleſs and Unable, is it not Uſeleſs?

HIPPIAS.

Without Doubt.

SOCRATES.

Power then is Beautiful, and Want of Power is the Contrary.

HIPPIAS.

Quite right. And many Things there are, Socrates, which evince the Truth of this Concluſion: but particularly it holds good in Politicks. For the having Ability in Public Affairs, and Power in the State of which we are Members, is of all Things the moſt Beautiful: and Want

of

of ſuch Power, with a total Defect of any ſuch Ability, has of all Things the meaneſt Aſpect.

SOCRATES.

You ſay well. In the Name of the Gods then, Hippias, does it not follow from all This, that Skill and Knowlege are of all Things the moſt Beautiful, and Want of them the Contrary?

HIPPIAS.

[78] Ay, what think you of This, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

Softly, my dear Friend: for I am under ſome Fears about the Rectitude of our preſent Concluſions.

HIPPIAS.

What are you afraid of, Socrates? For the Buſineſs of our Inquiry is now in a fair Way, and goes on as we could wiſh.

SOCRATES.

I would it were ſo. But let You and I conſider together upon this Point. Could any Man execute a Work, of which he has neither Knowlege, nor any other Kind of Abilitys for the Performance?

HIPPIAS.

[78] *Hippias* is much flattered, and highly elevated, by this whole Deſcription of the Beautifull now drawn; preſuming himſelf intereſted deeply in it, on account of his ſuppoſed *Political Abilitys*, his *various Knowlege*, and that *Skill in Arts*, as well the Mechanic as the Polite, for which he is celebrated in the *Leſſer Hippias*.

HIPPIAS.

By no Means. For how ſhould a Man do That, for the doing of which he has no Abilitys?

SOCRATES.

Thoſe People then who do wrong, and who err in the Execution of any thing, without erroneous or wrong Intention, would they ever have done or executed Things wrong, had they not been Able to do or execute them in that Manner?

HIPPIAS.

Clearly they would not.

SOCRATES.

But the Able are able thro their Abilitys: for it is not Inability, which any way enables them.

HIPPIAS.

Certainly, not.

SOCRATES.

And All, who do any thing, are able to do what they do.

HIPPIAS.

True.

SOCRATES.

And all Men do many more wrong Things, than right; and commit Errors, from their Infancy; without intending to do wrong, or to err.

HIPPIAS.

The Fact is ſo.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Well then: thoſe Abilitys, and thoſe Means or Inſtruments, which help and are uſeful in the doing or executing any thing wrong, whether ſhall we ſay They are beautiful? or are they not rather far from being ſo?

HIPPIAS.

Far from it, in My Opinion, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

The Able and Uſeful therefore, Hippias, in Our Opinion, it ſeems, no longer is the Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

Still it is ſo, Socrates, if it has Power to do what is right, or is Uſeful to a Good Purpoſe.

SOCRATES.

That Account is then rejected, that the Able and Uſefull ſimply and abſolutely is the Beautifull. But the Thought, Hippias, which our Mind laboured with, and wanted to expreſs, was This, that the Uſefull and Able for the producing of any Good, That is the Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

This indeed ſeems to be the Caſe.

SOCRATES.

But the Thing thus deſcribed is the Profitable. Is it not?

HIPPIAS.

It is.

SOCRATES.

From hence then is derived the Beauty of Bodys, the Beauty of Moral Precepts, of Knowlege and Wiſdom, and of all thoſe Things juſt now enumerated; they are Beautiful, becauſe Profitable.

HIPPIAS.

Evidently ſo.

SOCRATES.

The Profitable therefore, Hippias, ſhould ſeem to be Our Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

Beyond all Doubt, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

But the Profitable is That, which effects or produces Good.

HIPPIAS.

True.

SOCRATES.

And the Efficient is no other Thing than the Cauſe, Is it?

HIPPIAS.

Nothing elſe.

SOCRATES.

The Cauſe of Good therefore is the Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

Right.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Now the Cauſe, Hippias, is a Thing different from That, which it cauſes. For the Cauſe can by no means be the Cauſe of its Self. Conſider it thus: Did not the Cauſe appear to be the Efficient?

HIPPIAS.

Clearly.

SOCRATES.

And by the Efficient no other Thing is effected, than That which is produced or generated; but This is not the Efficient itſelf.

HIPPIAS.

You are in the Right.

SOCRATES.

Is not That then, which is produced or generated One Thing, and the Efficient a Thing different?

HIPPIAS.

It is.

SOCRATES.

The Cauſe therefore is not the Cauſe of its Self; but of That, which is generated or produced by it.

HIPPIAS.

Without Doubt.

SOCRATES.

If the Beautifull be then the Cauſe of Good, Good itſelf muſt be produced or generated by the Beautifull. And for this Reaſon, it ſhould ſeem, we cultivate and ſtudy Prudence,

dence, and every other fair Virtue, becauſe their Production and their Iſſue is well worth our Study and our Care, as being Good its Self. Thus are we likely to find from our Inquirys, that the Beautifull, as it ſtands related to Good, has the Nature of a Kind of Father.

HIPPIAS.

The very Caſe, Socrates: You are perfectly right in what you ſay.

SOCRATES.

Am I not right alſo in This, that neither is the Father the Son, nor is the Son the Father?

HIPPIAS.

Right in That alſo.

SOCRATES.

Nor is the Cauſe the Production, nor the Production on the other hand the Cauſe.

HIPPIAS.

Very right.

SOCRATES.

By Jove then, my Friend, neither is the Beautifull Good, nor is the Good Beautiful. Do you think 'tis poſſible it ſhould be ſo? Is it conſiſtent with what we have ſaid, and are agreed in?

HIPPIAS.

By Jove, I think not.

SOCRATES.

Would this Opinion pleaſe us then, and ſhould we chuſe to

to abide by it, that the Beautifull is not Good, nor the Good Beautiful?

HIPPIAS.

By Jove, No; it would not pleaſe Me at all.

SOCRATES.

[79] Well ſaid, by Jupiter, Hippias: and Me it pleaſes the leaſt of Any of thoſe Deſcriptions or Accounts, which we have hitherto given, of the Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

[79] According to the Doctrine of *Socrates* and *Plato*, the *Same* Perſons, Things, and Actions, are in the true Senſe both καλὰ κ'αγαθὰ, *Beautiful* and *Good*: and the *Ideas* of *Good* and of *Beauty* ſo intirely coincide, and concur in *One*, that not only the Beautifull is Good, and the Good Beautiful; but alſo, that the Sovereign Beauty, αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, is the Source of all Good; and the Sovereign Good, αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, is the Source of all Beauty: Truths, which our Intelligent Readers may be able to comprehend, by conſidering the latter Part of the *Philebus*, and the Sixth Book of the *Republick*. Conſonant to This is That Doctrine of the *Stoicks*, that *the Beautifull and the Good are Equivalent*, ἰσοδυναμεῖ, that is, have the ſame Force and Power. See *Diog. Laert.* L. 7. p. 427. Edit. *Wetſtein*. That excellent Critic and Annotator, *Menage*, agrees with *Clemens* of *Alexandria* in obſerving, that Theſe Philoſophers derived all their Opinions of this Kind from *Plato*. See *Menag.* in *Laert.* p. 300. According to *Ariſtotle* indeed, the Ideas of *Good* and *Beauty* are *different*; becauſe "*Good*, he ſays, is "always found in *Action*, (or Operation,) and *Beauty* is found ALSO in "Things *Unmoved and Stable*;" Τὸ μὲν [ἀγαθὸν] γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐν πράξει, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ΚΑΙ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις. *Metaphyſic.* L. 13. C. 3. But in This he is ſo far from being oppoſite to the Doctrine of his Maſter, that he could no way better have illuſtrated the Platonic Doctrine of a SOVEREIGN MIND; *Stable in its Self, yet the Fountain of all Motion; and operating Good perpetually, by a pepetual Efflux of Form and Beauty.*

HIPPIAS.

So I perceive.

SOCRATES.

That Definition of it therefore, which we thought juſt now the moſt excellent of all, that the Profitable, the Uſefull and Able to produce ſome Good or other, was that Beautifull, is in Danger of loſing all its Credit with Us; and of appearing, if poſſible, more ridiculous than our former Accounts of it, where we reckoned the Maiden to be the Beautifull, or any other Particular, whoſe Defect we have before diſcovered.

HIPPIAS.

It ſeems ſo indeed.

SOCRATES.

And for my own Part, Hippias, I ſee no Way, where to turn my ſelf any more; but am abſolutely at a Loſs. Have You any thing to ſay?

HIPPIAS.

Not at preſent. But, as I ſaid juſt now, after a little Conſidering, I am certain, I ſhall find it out.

SOCRATES.

But I fear, ſo extreme is my Deſire of knowing it, that I ſhall not be able to wait Your Time. Beſides, I have juſt met with, as I imagine, a fair Kind of Opening to the Diſcovery. For conſider That which gives us Delight and Joy, (I ſpeak not of all Kinds of Pleaſure, but of That only which ariſes in us thro the Hearing and the Sight,) whe-

ther we ſhould not call This the Beautifull. [80] And how, indeed, could we diſpute it? Seeing, that 'tis the Beautifull of our own Species, Hippias, with the Sight of whom we are ſo delighted: that we take Pleaſure in viewing all beautiful Works of the Loom or Needle; and whatever is well painted, carved, or moulded. 'Tis the ſame with the Hearing: for well-meaſured Sounds and all muſical Harmony, the Beautys of Proſaic Compoſition alſo, with pretty Fables and well-framed Storys, have the like Effect upon us, to be agreeable, to be delightful, and to charm. Were we to give therefore that petulant and ſaucy Fellow this Anſwer — "Noble Sir, the Beautifull is That, which gives us "Pleaſure thro the Hearing and thro the Sight," do you think we ſhould not reſtrain his Inſolence?

HIPPIAS.

For My Part, Socrates, I think the Nature of the Beautifull now truly well explained.

SOCRATES.

But what ſhall we ſay of the Beauty of Manners, and of Laws, Hippias? Shall we ſay it gives us Pleaſure thro the Hearing, or thro the Sight? or is it to be ranked under ſome other Kind?

HIPPIAS.

[80] In the *Greek* we read thus, Πῶς τὶ ἄρ' ἂν ἀγωνιζοίμεθα; But, ſince we know of no Precedent in *Plato* for the Uſe of two Interrogatives in this Manner, that is, without the Conjunction ἢ (*or*) between them; we ſuppoſe it ought to be read, either Πῶς ΓΑ᾽Ρ ἂν ἀγωνιζοίμεθα; or ΠΡΟ᾽Σ τὶ ΓΑ᾽Ρ κ. τ. λ. *To what Purpoſe ſhould we contend about it?*

HIPPIAS.

Perhaps the Man may not think of This.

SOCRATES.

By the Dog, Hippias, but That Man would, of whom I ſtand in Awe the moſt of all Men; and before whom I ſhould be moſt aſhamed if I trifled, and pretended to utter ſomething of great Importance, when in Reality I talked idly, and ſpoke nothing to the Purpoſe.

HIPPIAS.

Who is He?

SOCRATES.

Socrates, the Son of Sophroniſcus; who would no more ſuffer Me to throw out ſuch Random-Speeches, or ſo readily decide on Points which I had not thorowly ſifted, than he would allow me to talk of Things which I am ignorant of, as if I knew them.

HIPPIAS.

Why really I muſt own, that to Me my ſelf, ſince You have ſtarted the Obſervation, the Beauty of Laws ſeems referable to another Kind.

SOCRATES.

Softly, Hippias. For, tho we have fallen into freſh Difficultys, equal to our former ones, about the Nature of the Beautifull, we are in a fair Way, I think, of extricating our ſelves out of them.

HIPPIAS.

How ſo, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

I will tell you how the Matter appears to Me: whether or no there be any Thing Material in what I ſay, You will conſider. The Beauty then of Laws and of Manners, I imagine, may poſſibly be found not altogether abſtracted from [81] that Kind of Senſation, which ariſes in the Soul thro the Senſes of Hearing and of Sight. But let us abide a while by this Definition, that "What gives us Pleaſure thro theſe "Senſes is the Beautifull," without bringing the Beauty of Laws the leaſt into Queſtion. Suppoſe then, that either the Man of whom I am ſpeaking, or any Other, ſhould interrogate us after this Manner; "For what Reaſon, Hippias "and Socrates, have you ſeparated from the Pleaſant in Ge-"neral that Species of it, in which you ſay conſiſts the Beau-"tifull; denying the Character of Beautiful to thoſe Spe-"cies of Pleaſure which belong to the Other Senſes, to the "Pleaſures of Taſt, the Joys of Venus, and all others of "the ſame Claſs? Do you refuſe them the Character of "Pleaſant alſo, and maintain that no Pleaſure neither is to "be found in theſe Senſations, or in Any thing beſide See-"ing and Hearing?" Now, Hippias, What ſhall we ſay to this?

HIPPIAS.

By all Means, Socrates, we muſt allow Pleaſure to be found alſo in theſe Senſations; a Pleaſure very exquiſite.

[81] Meaning, that in theſe Caſes alſo it conſiſts in *Proportion*, *Order*, and *Harmony*; thoſe of a *Civil Society* in the Firſt Caſe; in the Other, thoſe of a Man's own *Life* and *Actions*.

SOCRATES.

" Since Theſe Senſations then afford Pleaſure, will he ſay, " no leſs than thoſe Others, [82] Why do you deprive them " of the Name of Beautiful, and rob them of their proper " Share of Beauty?"—" Becauſe there is no one, who would " not laugh at us, we ſhall anſwer, were we to call Eating a " Beautiful Thing, inſtead of a Pleaſant; or the ſmelling ſweet " Odours, were we to ſay, not that 'twas Pleaſant, but that " 'twas Beautiful. Above all, in Amorous Enjoyments, all the " World would contend, there was the higheſt Degree of the " Sweet and Pleaſant; but that whoever was engaged in " them ſhould take Care not to be ſeen, the Act of Love be- " ing far from agreeable to the Sight, or Beautiful."—Now, Hippias, when we have thus anſwered, he may reply perhaps in this Manner — " I apprehend perfectly well the " Reaſon, why you have always been aſhamed to call Theſe " Pleaſures Beautiful; 'tis becauſe they ſeem not ſo to Men. " But the Queſtion, which I aſked you, was not —What " ſeemed Beautiful to the Multitude; but —What was ſo " in Reality." — Then ſhall We anſwer, I preſume, only by repeating our laſt Hypotheſis, that " We our Selves give " the Name of Beautiful to That Part only of the Pleaſant, " which

[82] This Sentence is ill pointed by *H. Stephens*, in two Places: in the Firſt of which, at leaſt, we think it was done with Deſign; ſo as to give us this Conſtruction — *What? Do you deprive*, &c. That learned Editor was fond of doing the ſame in many other Sentences; and particularly in one, a little before this, he has in the Margin propoſed the like Alteration.

" which ariſeth in us by Means of our Sight and Hear-
" ing."— But have You any thing to ſay, which may be of Service to our Argument? Shall we anſwer Aught beſides, Hippias?

HIPPIAS.

To what He has ſaid, Socrates, 'tis unneceſſary to make any farther Anſwer.

SOCRATES.

" Very well now, will He ſay: If the Pleaſant then,
" ariſing thro the Sight and Hearing, be the Beautifull;
" Whatever Portion of the Pleaſant happens not to be
" This, 'tis clear it cannot be the Beautifull."— Shall we admit this?

HIPPIAS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

" Is That Portion of the Pleaſant then, he will ſay,
" which ariſes thro the Sight, the Same with That which
" ariſes thro the Sight and Hearing? or is That, which
" ariſes thro the Hearing, the Same with That which ariſes
" thro the Hearing and the Sight?"— " That which ariſ-
" eth in us thro Either of thoſe Senſes alone, and not thro
" the Other, we ſhall anſwer, is by no means the Same
" with That which ariſes thro them Both. For this ſeems
" to be the Import of Your Queſtion. But Our Meaning
" was, that Each of theſe Species of the Pleaſant was, by
" its ſelf ſeparately, the Beautifull; and that they were
" alſo,

" alſo, Both of them together, the Same Beautifull."— Should we not anſwer ſo?

HIPPIAS.

By all Means.

SOCRATES.

" Does any Species of the Pleaſant then, he will ſay, " differ from any Other, whatever it be, ſo far as it is " Pleaſant? Obſerve; I aſk you not, if One Pleaſure is " greater or leſs than Another; or whether it is more or " leſs a Pleaſure: but whether there is any Difference be- " tween the Pleaſures in this Reſpect, that One of them is " Pleaſure, the Other not Pleaſure." — In Our Opinion there is no Difference between them, of this Kind. Is there any?

HIPPIAS.

I agree with You, there is not any.

SOCRATES.

" For ſome other Reaſon therefore, he will ſay it is, " than becauſe they are Pleaſures, that you have ſelected " Theſe Species of Pleaſure from the reſt, and given Them " the Preference. You have diſcerned, that there is Some- " thing or Other in them, by which they differ from the " reſt; with a View to which Difference you diſtinguiſh " them by the Epithet of Beautiful. Now the Pleaſure, " which ariſeth in us thro the Senſe of Seeing, deriveth not " its Beauty from any Thing [83] peculiarly belonging to that " Senſe.

[83] That is, not from *Colour*, or from *Figure*; but from the due *Degree* and proper *Diſpoſition* of the Colours; or from the juſt *Size*, fit

" Senſe. For if This were the Cauſe of its being beau-
" tiful, that Other Pleaſure which ariſes thro the Hear-
" ing never would be beautiful, as not partaking of That,
" which is peculiar to the Senſe of Seeing."—" You are in
" the Right;" ſhall we ſay?

HIPPIAS.

We will.

SOCRATES.

" So neither, on the other hand, does the Pleaſure, pro-
" duced in us thro the Senſe of Hearing, derive its Beauty
" from any Circumſtance, which [84] peculiarly attends the
" Hearing. For in that Caſe the Pleaſure, produced thro
" Seeing, would not be Beautiful, [85] as not partaking of
" That,

fit *Arrangement*, and *Proportion* of the Parts; in a Word, from *Meaſure*, *Harmony*, and *Order*.

[84] That is, not from *Sound*; but from its juſt *Degree*, and proper *Tone*; from the *Concord* of Sounds and their *orderly Succeſſion*; from thoſe *Numbers* and *Proportions*, by which Sound is *meaſured*.

[85] The *Greek* of this Paſſage is thus printed, ἀκῶν ἔτι γε δι' ἀκοῆς ἡδονή. So, in the Speech of *Socrates*, immediately preceding, where the Reaſoning is the ſame, only the Terms inverted, we read ἀκῶν ἔτι γε δι' ὄψεως ἡδονή. In both Paſſages the Senſe is thus very lame. *Stephens* propoſes This Reading, ἀκῶν ἔςί γε κ. τ. λ. which is found, he ſays, in ſome old Manuſcript. But the Senſe is very little amended by this Alteration. *Cornarius*, whether from that Manuſcript in the *Haſſenſtein* Library, which he was favoured with the Uſe of, or from his own Sagacity, has recovered a Part, at leaſt, of the true Reading; thus, ἀκ ἅσα ἔτι γε κ. τ. λ. For, that we ought to read ἀκ ἅσα, there can be no Doubt; the Argumentation ſhews it ſufficiently: but this Amendment may, we imagine, be improved by reading, ἀκ ἅσα ἦγε δι' ἀκοῆς (and in the former Paſſage δι' ὄψεως) ἡδονή.

" That, which is peculiar to the Senſe of Hearing." — Shall we allow, Hippias, that the Man is in the Right, when he ſays this?

HIPPIAS.

Allow it.

SOCRATES.

" But Both theſe Pleaſures now are Beautiful, you ſay." For ſo we ſay: do we not?

HIPPIAS.

We do.

SOCRATES.

" There is Something in them therefore, the Same in " Both, to which they owe their Beauty, a Beauty Com- " mon to them Both. There is Something, I ſay, which " they have belonging to them Both in Common, and " alſo in Particular to Each. For otherwiſe they would " not, Both and Each of them, be Beautifull." — Anſwer now, as if you were ſpeaking to Him.

HIPPIAS.

I anſwer then, that, in My Opinion, [86] you give a true Account of the Matter.

SOCRATES.

[86] In the Edition of *Plato* by *Stephens* we read the *Greek* of this Paſſage thus, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ ἔχειν, ὡς λέγει; and by a Marginal Note we find, that 'twas ſo printed by Deſign. But the Editions of *Aldus* and of *Walder* give us the laſt Word, λέγεις, which is certainly right: for in reading λέγει, *Hippias* is made to ſpeak *of* the Man, not *to* him, contrary to the Intention of *Plato*, expreſſed in the preceding Sentence.

SOCRATES.

Should there be any Circumſtance therefore, attending on Both theſe Pleaſures of the Sight and Hearing taken together; yet if the Same Circumſtance attend not on Each taken ſeparately; [87] or ſhould Any attend on Each ſeparately, yet not on Both together; they cannot derive their Beauty from This Circumſtance.

HIPPIAS.

How is it poſſible, Socrates, that any Circumſtance whatever, which attends on Neither of them, ſhould ever attend on Both?

SOCRATES.

Do you think This impoſſible?

HIPPIAS.

I muſt be quite ignorant, I own, in Things of this Sort; as I am quite unuſed to ſuch Kind of Diſputes.

SOCRATES.

You jeſt, Hippias. But I am in Danger perhaps of fancying that I ſee Something, ſo circumſtanced, as You aver to be impoſſible.

HIPPIAS.

[87] In the *Greek* Text, after this firſt Part of the Sentence, Εἰ ἄρα τὶ αὕται αἱ ἡδοναὶ ἀμφότεραι πεπόνθασιν, ἑκατέρα δὲ μὴ, there is a manifeſt Omiſſion of the following Words, ἢ ἑκατέρα μὲν, ἀμφότεραι δὲ μὴ, as will appear afterwards in Page 114, where *Socrates* refers to this very Sentence.

HIPPIAS.

You are in no Danger of any ſuch Fancy, Socrates: but are pleaſed to look aſquint purpoſely; that is all.

SOCRATES.

Many Things, I aſſure you, of that Kind appear to Me very evident. But I give no Credit to them; becauſe they are not evident to You, who have raiſed a larger Fortune than any Man living, by the Profeſſion of Philoſophy; and becauſe they appear only to Me, who have never in that Way earned a Farthing. I have ſome Suſpicion, however, that poſſibly you are not in Earneſt with me, but deſign to impoſe upon me: ſo Many Things of that Kind do I perceive ſo plainly.

HIPPIAS.

No one will know better than your Self, Socrates, whether I am in Earneſt with you or not, if you will but begin and tell me, What thoſe Things are which you perceive ſo plainly. You will ſoon ſee, that you talk idly. For you will never find a Circumſtance attending us Both together, which attends ſeparately neither You nor Me.

SOCRATES.

How ſay you, Hippias? But perhaps You have Reaſon on your Side, and I may not apprehend it. Let me therefore explain to you my Meaning more diſtinctly. To Me then it appears, that ſome Circumſtance of Being, which attends not My Individual Perſon, nor Yours, Something which

which belongs neither to Me, nor to You, may yet poſſibly belong to Both of us, and attend Both our Perſons taken together: [88] and on the other hand, that certain Circumſtances of Being, not attending us Both taken together, may attend Each of our ſeparate and ſingle Perſons.

HIPPIAS.

You tell me of Prodigys ſtill greater, I think, [89] now, Socrates, than thoſe which you told me of juſt before. For conſider; if Both of us are Honeſt Man, muſt not Each of us be Honeſt? or, ſuppoſing Each of us Diſhoneſt, muſt we not Both be ſo? if Both are ſound and well, is not Each alſo? or [90] ſhould Each of us now be tired of any thing, or come off

[88] The *Greek* of this Paſſage is thus printed; ἕτερα δ' αὖ, ἃ ἀμφότεροι πεπόνθαμεν εἶναι, ταῦτα ἑκάτερον εἶναι ἡμῶν. By which the Senſe of this Part of the Sentence is made exactly the *Same* with that of the former Part. But the Words [ἕτερα δ' αὖ] plainly indicate, that Something *different* is intended. And what This preciſely is, will appear in the Beginning of Page 112; where this Sentence of *Socrates* is repeated in other Words and ridiculed by *Hippias*. In Conformity with which undoubted Meaning of this Paſſage, we are obliged to make an Alteration here in the *Greek* Text, and to read it thus, ἕτερα δ' αὖ, ἃ ΜΗ᾽ ἀμφότεροι πεπόνθαμεν εἶναι, ταῦτα ΕΚΑΤΕΡΟΝ εἶναι ἡμῶν.

[89] Inſtead of αὖ, we preſume, that we ought here to read νῦν, as oppoſed to ὀλίγον πρότερον at the End of the Sentence.

[90] Whoever has any Taſt for Humour, cannot fail of obſerving the Drollery, with which *Hippias* is here made to confeſs, in what Condition he finds himſelf; tired of the Converſation upon a Subject, the Tendency of which he is ignorant of; confuted over and over; and at length quite puzzled with a ſeeming Paradox. His ſly Inſinuation alſo here, that *Socrates* was in the ſame Condition with Himſelf; and his Other, juſt before, that *Socrates* reaſoned unfairly, like Himſelf and

off ill in ſome Combat between us, or be amazed and confounded, or be affected any other Way, would not Both of us be in the Same Plight? To go farther; in caſe that we had, Both of us [91], Images of our ſelves, made of Gold, or Silver, or Ivory; or that Both of us, if you will give me Leave to ſay it, were Generous, or Wiſe, or Honourable; did Both of us happen to be Old, or Young; or to be poſſeſſed of any other Human Quality; or to be in any Condition whatever, incident to Human Life; muſt not Each of us be, of abſolute Neceſſity, that very ſame Kind of Man, and in thoſe very ſame Circumſtances?

SOCRATES.

Beyond all Doubt.

HIPPIAS.

his Brother-Sophiſts; theſe Strokes of Humour will be obvious to All, who are acquainted with *Plato*'s artful and humourous Way of Writing. But Thoſe, who have a Delicacy of Taſt to diſcern the ſeveral Kinds of Humour, will have an additional Pleaſure in diſtinguiſhing the coarſe Sarcaſms and *Buffoon*-Manner of *Hippias*, both in this Speech and before in Page 72, from the genteel and fine *Raillery* always uſed by *Socrates*.

[91] The following Caſes are ſuggeſted to *Hippias* by his Vanity. For the *Athenians* having, not long before, been ſo greatly taken with the Wiſdom and Eloquence of *Gorgias*, as to ſet up a Statue of him, made of Gold, in the Temple of *Apollo*; 'tis probable, that *Hippias* flattered himſelf with Hopes of the like Honour: and for fear perhaps that *Socrates* might have been offended at the Liberty which He had juſt taken with him, thought it expedient to ſooth him with the ſame Fancys; thus mixing Flattery with Affronts, as it is uſual with Men of His Character. From the Expreſſion alſo uſed in the Cloſe of theſe Inſtances, we think it appears farther, that *Plato* had a ſecret Reference to the Gods of his Country in this Paſſage, and contrived it ſo as to be ſubſervient to his Deſign in this latter Part of the Dialogue.

HIPPIAS.

But You, Socrates, with your Companions and Fellow-Diſputants, conſider not Things Univerſally, or in the Whole. Thus you take the Beautifull and chop it into Pieces: and every Thing in Nature, which happens to be the Subject of your Diſcourſe, you ſerve in the ſame Manner, [92] ſplitting and dividing it. Hence you are unacquainted with [93] the Greatneſs of Things, with Bodys of Infinite

[92] It was the Manner of *Socrates* in Converſation, whatever was the Subject of it, to aſcend to the Conſideration of the Thing in *General*; to divide it into its ſeveral *Species*; and to diſtinguiſh each Species from the reſt by ſome peculiar *Character*, in order to come at the *definite* and *preciſe Nature* of the very Thing in Queſtion.

[93] All Things in Nature, diſtinguiſhed into their ſeveral *Kinds*, *General* and *Specific*, are, according to the Platonic Doctrine, the *Unfolding* of *Univerſal Form and Beauty*. That this *Principle*, which every where *bounds* every Part of Nature, may appear in a brighter Light; That *Oppoſite* Principle, *Infinitude* or *the Infinite*, is here exhibited to View: and amongſt the various Repreſentations given of it by the Antient Phyſiologiſts, that of *Anaxagoras* is ſingled out from the reſt; probably for this Reaſon, becauſe it affords the ſtrongeſt Contraſt: the Infinite, according to His Doctrine, being, if the Expreſſion may be allowed us, *Infinite the moſt of all*; or, as *Simplicius* ſtiles it, ἀπειράκις ἄπειρον, *Infinitely Infinite*. A Summary Account of which may be neceſſary to a full Comprehenſion of the Paſſage before us.—Down to the Time of *Anaxagoras*, all the Philoſophers agreed in the Doctrine of *One Infinite, Material, Principle of Things*. *This* was held by *Pythagoras* and his Followers to be Nothing elſe than a *Common Subject-Matter* of the *Four Elements*, or primary Forms of Nature: from the various *Combinations* of which Four, in various *Proportions*, are made all other Natural Bodys. By the Diſciples of *Anaximander* it was ſuppoſed to have *Form*, tho *Indiſtinct* and *Indeterminate*; out of which all Contrarietys

finite Magnitude, thro the Natural Continuity of Being. And now ſo much are You a Stranger to the Vaſtneſs of this

View

trarietys aroſe through *Separation*. Others imagined the Infinite to have ſome *Determinate* and *Diſtinct Form:* And Theſe again were divided. For Some, at the Head of whom was *Thales*, thought it a *Watery Fluid*, or Moiſture, replete with the *Seeds* of all Things; Every thing being produced from ſome *Seminal Principle* by *Evolution* and *Dilatation*, thro the *Action* of the *Moiſt Fluid*. In the Opinion of Others, of *Anaximenes* and His School, it was a Kind of *Air*; from the *Rarefaction* and *Condenſation* of which were produced other Great and Uniform Kinds of Body throughout the Univerſe, by Mixture making the Leſſer, the Compoſite. Such were the moſt ancient Accounts of the *Material Cauſe* of Things, and their Origin out of the *One Infinite*. But *Anaxagoras* ſtruck out a new Road to the Knowledge of Nature. For, denying the Origin of Things from any *Infinite One*, whether determinate or indeterminate, formed or unformed; denying the Exiſtence of any *Primary* or *Elementary Bodys*; denying all *Eſſential Change* in Nature, even any *Alteration* in any Thing, except ſuch as aroſe from *Local Motion*, or the *ſhifting of Parts* from one Body to another; He taught, that the Corpuſcula, or component Parts of Things, were always what they are at preſent: for that the Forms of Nature, *Innumerable* in their *Kinds*, were compoſed of *Similar* and *Homogeneous* Parts. Farther he taught, that Each of theſe minute Bodys, tho *Homogeneous* with That *Whole* of which it was a *Part*, was itſelf compoſed of Parts *Diſſimilar* and *Heterogeneous*, *infinite* in *Number*; there being *no Bounds* in Nature to *Minuteneſs:* that theſe Heterogeneous Bodys, infinitely minute, were of *all Kinds*; ſo that *All things*, in ſome Meaſure, were *together every where*; and Each of thoſe Corpuſcula, apparently ſo Uniform, contained all the various Principles of Things: that the *Predominance* of ſome *One* of theſe *Principles*, that is, the *Quantity* of it exceeding that of the reſt, conſtituted the *Nature* of each minute Body; fitting it alſo for Union with *Bodys Homogeneous* to it, that is, with other Bodys, where the *ſame Principle* was *predominant:* that, All things being in

per-

View of the Univerſe, as to imagine that any Thing, whether Being or Circumſtance of Being, can poſſibly belong to

perpetual Motion, which firſt began, and is continued on by *Active Mind*, *diſpoſing All things*; the Predominance of each Principle was continually *fluctuating* and *changing*; the *Deſtruction* of the *preſent* Predominance was the *Diſſolution* of each temporary Being; and a *new Predominance*, That of ſome other Principle, was the *Generation* of what we call a *New Being*. For Inſtance; whereas every *Drop* of *Water* contains *Aerial Particles* within it; as ſoon as theſe begin to *predominate* in any Watery Drop, it riſes in *Air*; and receiving there an *Increaſe* of the *Aerial Principle*, by Degrees becomes *united* to the *Air*. So, *Air* refines into *Fire*, and thickens into *Water*, thro the *Over-powering* of the One or the Other of theſe *Neighbour-Principles*, with which it ever had maintained a *ſecret Correſpondence*. So, the *Earthy Particles*, accumulated in the *Water*, produce *Mud*; by Degrees hardening into *Earth*; thence into various *Mineral Bodys*, *Stones*, and *Metals*, according to the *Kind* of Earth *predominant* in each Place thro Motion. Theſe again crumble into *Common Earth*: from which all the various *Vegetable Beings* ariſe in like Manner, *nouriſhed* and *increaſed* by the *Accumulation* of *Particles Homogeneous*; and into which they fall and are diſſolved again, thro the *Decay* and *Diminution* of thoſe Particles, whoſe ſuperior *Number* and *Strength* to reſiſt Others of a different Kind had before conſtituted the Being. In the ſame Manner, all the Parts of Animals, whether Muſcular, Membranous, Bony, or any other, receive *Nouriſhment* or admit *Decay*, by *Addition* or *Subtraction* of Homogeneous Particles. It will be eaſy for a Thinking Mind to purſue *Nature, acting in This Method*, according to *Anaxagoras*, thro All things. The Principles of Things are thus made Infinite, not only in Number and Minuteneſs; but there being alſo a Continuity of ὁμοιομέρειαι or Homogeneous Particles, ἁφῇ συνεχιζομέναι, thro the Univerſe, Every ὁμοιομέρια, that is, Every Kind of Things, is a *Natural Body*, *Infinite in Magnitude*, and infinitely diviſible into ſuch Parts as are wholly agreeing in their Kind. *Simplicius*, in his *Commentary* on the *Phyſicks* of *Ariſtotle*, to which ineſtimable Magazine of ancient Phyſiology we are indebted for

to Both thoſe Pleaſures which we are ſpeaking of, taken together, yet not belong to Each of them; or, on the other hand, may belong to Each, without belonging to Both. So void of Thought and Conſideration, ſo ſimple, and ſo narrow-minded are You and your Companions.

SOCRATES.

Such is the Lot of Our Condition, Hippias. 'Tis not what a Man will, ſays the Common Proverb, but what he can. However, You are always kind in aſſiſting us with Your Inſtructions. For but juſt now, before You had taught me better, how ſimple my Mind was, and how narrow my Way of Thinking, I ſhall give you ſtill a plainer Proof, by telling you what were my Thoughts upon the preſent Subject;—if You will give me Leave.

HIPPIAS.

You will tell them to One who knows them already, Socrates. For I am well acquainted with the different Ways of Thinking, and know the Minds of All who philoſophiſe. Notwithſtanding, if it will give Pleaſure to your Self, you may tell me.

SOCRATES.

for the chief Part of this Note, draws the ſame Concluſion: his Words are theſe; ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων πρόχειρον συννοεῖν, ὅτι εἰ πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς ἐκκρίνεται, καὶ πάντα ἐν πᾶσίν ἐσιν, ὐ μόνον τὸ πᾶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕκαστον, ὐ τῷ πλήθει μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μεγέθει, ἀπειράκις ἄπειρον ἔσαι. *From the Account now given it is eaſy to conceive, that if Every Thing is made out of Every Thing by Separation, and All Things are in All, not only the Univerſe, but every Kind of Things therein, is Infinitely Infinite, not only in the Number of its Parts, but alſo in Magnitude.* See *Ariſtot. Phyſic.* L. 1. C. 4. and L. 3. C. 4. *Simplic. Com.* fol. 6. and 105. b. 106. a.

SOCRATES.

To Me, I confeſs, it will. You muſt know then, my Friend, that I was ſo fooliſh, till I had received from You better Information, as to imagine of my Self and You, that Each of us was One Perſon; and that This, which Each of us was, Both of us were not, as not being One, but Two Perſons. — Such a Simpleton was I! — But from You have I now learnt, that if Both of us are Two Perſons, Each of us alſo by Neceſſity is Two; and that, if Each of us be but One, it follows by the ſame Neceſſity, that Both of us are no More. For, by Reaſon of the Continuity of Being, according to Hippias, 'tis impoſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe; [94] Each of us being of Neceſſity whatever Both of us are, and Both whatever Each. And now, perſuaded by You to believe theſe Things, here I ſit me down, and reſt contented. But firſt inform me, Hippias, whether we are One Perſon, You and I together; or whether You are Two Perſons, and I Two Perſons.

HIPPIAS.

What mean you, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

[94] The Words of *Anaxagoras*, as cited by *Simplicius*, pag. 106. b. really favour ſuch a Concluſion. For he expreſsly ſays, that his Syſtem of the Continuity of Being included τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἕξεις, *every Thing which any Being had, or ſuffered:* that is, in Scholaſtic Language, all the *Propertys* and *Accidents* of Being; or, in Common Speech, the *Condition* and *Circumſtances* of Things; which, as he tells us, inſeparably follow and attend their ſeveral Natures.

SOCRATES.

The very Thing, which I ſay. For I am afraid of entering with you into a farther Diſcuſſion of the Subject, becauſe you fall into a Paſſion with me, whenever you ſay any thing which you take to be Important. To venture for once, however; tell me—Is not Each of us One? and is not the being One a Circumſtance attendant upon our Being?

HIPPIAS.

Without Doubt.

SOCRATES.

If Each of us then be One, Each of us muſt be alſo Odd. Or think you that One is not an Odd Number?

HIPPIAS.

I think it is.

SOCRATES.

Are we Odd Both together then, notwithſtanding that we are Two?

HIPPIAS.

That is abſurd, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

But Both together, we are Even. Is it not ſo?

HIPPIAS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

Now, becauſe Both of us together we are Even, does it follow from thence that Each of us ſingly too is Even?

HIPPIAS.

HIPPIAS.

Certainly, not.

SOCRATES.

There is not therefore ſuch an abſolute Neceſſity, as you ſaid juſt now there was, that whatever Both of us were, Each ſhould be the Same; and that whatever Each of us was, the Same muſt we be, Both.

HIPPIAS.

Not in [95] ſuch Caſes as Theſe, I acknowlege; but ſtill it holds True in [96] Such as I enumerated before.

SOCRATES.

That ſuffices, Hippias. I am contented with This Acknowlegement, that it appears to be ſo in Some Caſes, but in Others otherwiſe. For, if you remember from whence the preſent Diſpute aroſe, I ſaid, that the Pleaſures of Sight and Hearing could not derive their Beauty from any Circumſtance, which attended on Each, yet not on Both; neither from Any, which attended on Both, yet not on Each:

[95] Meaning Individual Beings, or the Particulars of any Species; conſidered meerly as Such, without any Accidental or Adventitious Quality, by which One is diſtinguiſhed from Another: Thus, *John* is One (Individual) Man, or Animal or Being; *Thomas* is Another. To Theſe only Number is applicable; together with ſuch Appendages of Being and of Number, as extend to All things: ſuch as being the Same or Different, One or Many.

[96] Meaning the Kinds of any Thing, whether General or Specific; ſuch Qualitys alſo and other Circumſtances, of which Many do or may partake: for Inſtance, Animal, Vegetable; Tree, Flower; Wood, Stone; Air, Water; Red or Yellow, Round or Square, Hot or Cold, Above or Below, Still or in Motion.

but that the Beauty of them was derived from Something which they had, belonging to Both of them in Common, and in Particular to Each. And This I ſaid, becauſe You had admitted the Beauty of them Both together, and of Each ſeparately. From which I drew this Conſequence, that they were indebted for their Beauty to ſome Being, whoſe Preſence ſtill followed and attended on them Both; and not to Such, as fell ſhort of Either. And I continue ſtill in the ſame Mind. But anſwer me, as if we were now beginning this laſt Inquiry afreſh. Pleaſure thro the Sight and Pleaſure thro the Hearing then being ſuppoſed Beautiful, Both of them and Each; tell me, does not the Cauſe of their Beauty follow and attend on Both of them taken together, and upon Each alſo conſidered ſeparate?

HIPPIAS.

Without Doubt.

SOCRATES.

Is it then, becauſe they are Pleaſures, Both and Each of them, that they are Beautiful? Or, if This were the Cauſe, would not the Pleaſures of the other Senſes be Beautiful, as well as Theſe? For it appeared, that they were Pleaſures, as well as theſe: — if you remember.

HIPPIAS.

I remember it well.

SOCRATES.

But becauſe Theſe Pleaſures ariſe in us thro Sight and Hearing, This we aſſigned for the Cauſe of their being Beautiful.

HIPPIAS.

It was ſo determined.

SOCRATES.

Obſerve now, whether I am right or not: for as well as I can remember, we agreed, that the Pleaſant was the Beautifull; not, the Pleaſant in General; but thoſe Species of it only, which are produced thro Sight and Hearing.

HIPPIAS.

It is true.

SOCRATES.

Does not this Circumſtance then attend on Both theſe Pleaſures taken together? and is it not wanting to Each of them alone? For by no Means is Either of them alone, as was ſaid before, produced thro Both thoſe Senſes. Both of them are indeed thro Both, but not ſo is Each. Is This true?

HIPPIAS.

It is.

SOCRATES.

They are not beautiful therefore, Either of them, from any Circumſtance which attends on Either by its Self. For we cannot argue from Either to Both; nor from what Each is ſeparately, infer what they Both are jointly. So that we may aſſert the Joint Beauty of Both theſe Pleaſures: according to our preſent Hypotheſis of the Beautifull: but this Hypotheſis will not ſupport us in aſſerting any

Beauty

Beauty Separate in Either. Or how ſay we? Is it not of Neceſſity ſo?

HIPPIAS.

So it appears.

SOCRATES.

Say we then that Both are beautiful, but deny that Each is ſo?

HIPPIAS.

What Reaſon is there to the Contrary?

SOCRATES.

This Reaſon, my Friend, as it ſeems to Me; becauſe we had ſuppoſed certain Circumſtances, attendant upon Things with This Condition, that, if they appertained to any Two Things, Both together, they appertained at the ſame time to Each; and, if they appertained to Each, that they appertained alſo to Both. Of this Kind are all ſuch Circumſtances and Attendants of Things, as were enumerated by You. Are they not?

HIPPIAS.

They are.

SOCRATES.

But Such Circumſtances or Appendages of Being, as Thoſe related by Me, are otherwiſe: and of this Kind are the being Each, and the being Both. Have not I ſtated the Caſe rightly?

HIPPIAS.

You have.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Under which Kind then, Hippias, do you rank the Beautifull? do you rank it among Thoſe mentioned by your Self? as when you inferred, that if I was Well and Hearty, and You Well and Hearty, then Both of us were Well and Hearty: or if I was Honeſt and You Honeſt, then Both of us were Honeſt: or if we Both were ſo, it followed, that ſo was Each of us. Does the ſame Kind of Inference hold True in This Caſe? If I am Beautiful, and You are Beautiful, then Both of us are Beautiful; and if Both of us, then Each. Or is there no Reaſon, why it ſhould not here be, as it is in [97] Numbers? Two of which, taken together, may be Even; tho Each ſeparately is perhaps Odd, perhaps Even; or, as it is in [98] Magnitudes; where Two of

[97] For Inſtance; the Two *Odd* Numbers, Seven and Three, togegether make the *Even* Number, Ten: and the Two *Even* Numbers, Six and Four, make the very Same Number.

[98] For Inſtance; let there be ſuppoſed a Line, of Ten Inches in Length, meaſured by *whole Inches*: a Line of Three Inches $\frac{3}{4}$, and another Line of Two Inches $\frac{1}{4}$, are, Each of them, *Incommenſurable* with the firſt given Line; becauſe Neither of them can be meaſured completely by any Line ſo long as a *whole Inch*: yet Both together making Six Inches, they are *Commenſurable* with the Line of Ten Inches, by the *Inch-Meaſure*. — It is the ſame with the *Powers* of Two Lines. The Power of Either may be *Incommenſurable* with that of the Other, and alſo with ſome given Magnitude: yet the Power ariſing from Both may be *Commenſurable* with that Third Magnitude. See *Euclid. Elem.* Lib. 10. Prop. 35. — To the preſent Purpoſe alſo is applicable the following Theorem. The Diameter of a Square is demonſtrated by *Euclid* (*Elem.* x. 97.) to be Incommenſurable with its

of them, tho Each is Incommenſurable with ſome Third, yet Both together may perhaps be Commenſurable with it, perhaps Incommenſurable. A thouſand ſuch other Things there are, which I perceived, as I ſaid, with great Clearneſs. Now, to Whether of theſe Two Orders of Being do you refer the Beautifull? Does the proper Rank of it appear as evident to You as it does to Me? For to Me it appears highly abſurd, to ſuppoſe Both of us beautiful, yet Each of us not ſo; or Each of us beautiful, yet not ſo Both; no leſs abſurd, than it is to ſuppoſe the ſame Kind of Difference between the Natures of Both and Each in any of the Caſes put by You. Do you agree with Me then in ranking the Beautifull among Theſe, or do you refer it to the Oppoſite Claſs of Things?

HIPPIAS.

I intirely [99] agree with You, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

You do well, Hippias: becauſe we ſhall thus be freed from any farther Inquiry upon this Article. For, if the Beautifull be in that Claſs of Things, where We agree to place

its Side: And conſequently ſo is a Line twice as long as the Diameter. Yet the Rectangular Space, comprehended by that Diameter and by a Line of twice its Length, is equal to a Square, whoſe Side is Commenſurable with the Side of the given Square.

[99] In this, that the Beautifull belongs not to the Rank of Particulars, which are Infinite; but muſt be ſome Being *Univerſal*, running thro *All things*; communicating itſelf to All in various Meaſure, according to *its own Nature*; and thus introducing ORDER together with *Form*, not only into *Each Part*, but into the WHOLE OF THINGS.

place it, the Pleaſant then, which ariſeth in us thro Sight and Hearing, can no longer be ſuppoſed the Beautifull. Becauſe That, which comes thro Both thoſe Senſes jointly, may make the Pleaſures which ariſe from thence beautiful indeed Both taken together; but cannot make Either of them ſo, [100] conſidered as ſeparate from the Other. But that the Beautifull

[100] In handling ſo accurately and dwelling ſo long upon this laſt and moſt important Diſquiſition, *concerning the Beauty of Things taken together, tho wanting in Beauty when conſidered Separate*, our Philoſopher gives us an Opportunity of diſcovering perfectly wherein the Nature of Beauty conſiſts, and of clearing up a conſiderable Difficulty relating to the moſt Conſummate Beauty. For, tho it be impoſſible that any Two Things taken together ſhould be beautiful when Each is not ſo, in all Caſes where thoſe Things are in their own Natures *abſolutely Separate*; yet we find it otherwiſe in the Nature of *a Whole and Parts*. A beautiful *Whole* may loſe all its Beauty, when taken to *Pieces*; and the *Parts* of it may have no Beauty, when conſidered *Separate* and without Reference to the *Whole*.—'Tis ſo in the Structure of an *Animal*; 'tis ſo in a *Ship*, *Houſe*, or *City*; 'tis ſo in the Frame of a *Civil State*: *Parts* may appear unhandſome, vile, or loathſome; but they appear ſuch only to the *Partial Eye*: to a *Mind*, *comprehending* all the Parts together, thoſe which are vile, loathſome or unhandſome, appear, as they really are, fundamental to the Dignity, the Grace, and Beauty of the *Whole*.—So is it with That *moſt beautiful* of Things, *the World*. Parts of it may appear deformed, or diſordered, in a *Partial View*, or with Reference to *Man* alone. But to that GREAT MIND, who comprehends it *All together*, and to every other Mind, ſo far as it partakes of the *Divine View*, it appears the *Copy*, as *Plato* calls it, of his own beautiful Ideas, the *Image* of *Himſelf*, of *Univerſal Beauty*; or, in his other fine Metaphor, the *Expreſſion* in *Relief*, the *Taking off*, as it were from *Engravings*, all the ſeveral *Genuſes* and *Species* of *Things*; the *Higheſt Genus*, where they all *meet* and are *united*, being MIND.

Beautifull ſhould have ſuch an Effect, or communicate itſelf in this Manner, is abſurd to ſuppoſe; as You and I have agreed, Hippias.

HIPPIAS.

We agreed it was ſo, I own.

SOCRATES.

Tis impoſſible therefore, that the Pleaſant, ariſing in us thro Sight and Hearing, ſhould be the Beautifull; becauſe from This Hypotheſis an Abſurdity would follow.

HIPPIAS.

You have Reaſon on your Side.

SOCRATES.

" Begin again then, and tell me, will He ſay, for you " have miſt it now, What is that Beautifull, the Aſſociate " of Both theſe Pleaſures, for the Sake of which you give " them the Preference to all Others, by honouring them " with the Name of Beautifull." It appears to Me, Hippias, neceſſary for us to anſwer thus; that [101] " Theſe are " of all Pleaſures the moſt innocent and good, as well " Both of them taken together, as Each taken ſingly." Or can you tell me of any Circumſtance beſide, in which they differ from other Pleaſures?

HIPPIAS.

I know of None beſide: For they are indeed the Beſt of all.

SOCRATES.

[101] See the latter Part of the *Philebus*.

SOCRATES.

" This then, He will ſay, do you now maintain to be " the Beautifull, Pleaſure Profitable?" — " Tis ſo, in my " Opinion," I ſhall anſwer. — What Anſwer would you make?

HIPPIAS.

The Same.

SOCRATES.

" Well then, will He ſay; the Profitable, you know, " is That which is the Efficient of Good. And the Effi- " cient, as we agreed lately, is a Thing different from " the Effect. Our Reaſoning therefore has brought us " round to the ſame Point again: for thus neither would " the Good be Beautifull, nor would the Beautifull be " Good; Each of theſe being, upon this Hypotheſis, dif- " ferent from the Other." — " Moſt evidently ſo;" is the Anſwer we muſt make, Hippias, if we are of Sound Mind. For the Sacredneſs of Truth will never ſuffer us to oppoſe the Man, who has Truth with him on his Side.

HIPPIAS.

But now, Socrates, What think you all theſe Matters are, which we have been diſputing about? They are the Shreds and Tatters of an Argument, cut and torn, as I ſaid before, into a thouſand Pieces. But the Thing, which is Beautiful, as well as highly Valuable, is This; to be able to exhibit a fine Speech, in a becoming and handſome Manner, before the Council, or Court of Juſtice, or any

other Aſſembly or Perſon in Authority, to whom the Speech is addreſſed; Such a Speech, as hath the Power of Perſuaſion; and having ended, to depart, not with [102] mean and inſignificant Trophies of Victory, but with a Prize the nobleſt, the Preſervation of our Selves, our Fortunes, and our Friends. This you ought to be ambitious of, and bid Adieu to ſuch petty and paltry Diſputes; or you will appear as if you had quite loſt your Senſes, playing with Straws and Trifles, as you have been now doing.

SOCRATES.

O Friend Hippias! You are happy, that you know what Courſe of Life 'tis beſt for a Man to follow, and have followed it, according to your own Account, ſo ſucceſsfully your Self. But I—ſeem fated to be under the Power of ſome [103] Divine Spirit, who keeps me wandering continu-

ally

[102] Meaning the Applauſe of his Diſciples and Friends, who were then about him, as uſual with them in Public Places; and who were never better pleaſed, than when the Philoſopher expoſed the Ignorance of the Sophiſts. They were now, it ſeems, giving Marks of Pleaſure and Approbation: and *Hippias* diſcovers his ſecret Chagrin upon the Occaſion, tho at the ſame time he affects to deſpiſe it.

[103] The Words of *Plato* in this Place are δαιμονία τις τύχη: in which it is obſervable that he varys from his uſual Expreſſion θεῖα τύχη, or θεῖα μοῖρα, in other Places, where his *general* Meaning is the ſame as it is here: for the Explication of which we refer to our Notes near the Concluſion of the *Meno*. The Variation here has in it great Propriety and Beauty. For *Socrates* diſclaimed all Pretences to the *Poſſeſſion* of Wiſdom, which, he ſays in the *Banquet*, belongs to None but the Gods; and profeſſed only *Philoſophy*, or the *Love* of Wiſdom: and This, he tells us in the ſame excellent Speech, belongs to the φύσις δαι-

ally in Search of Truth, and ſtill at a Loſs where to find it. And whenever I lay my Difficultys and Perplexitys before You Wiſe Men, I meet with no other Anſwer from you than Contumely and Reproach. For you All tell me the ſame Thing, which You tell me now, "that I buſy my "ſelf about ſilly, minute, and inſignificant Matters."— On the other hand, when, upon giving Credit to what you All tell me, I ſay, as You do; "that to be able to ex-"hibit a fine Speech in a Court of Juſtice or any other "Aſſembly, and to go thro it in a proper and handſome "Manner, is the fineſt Thing in the World; and that no "Employment is ſo beautiful, or ſo well becomes a Man;" I then meet with Cenſure and Obloquy from [104] Some who are here preſent, but eſpecially from That Man who is always [105] reproving me. For He is my [106] Neareſt of Kin, and lives with me in the ſame Houſe. So, whenever I return

δαιμονία, the *Middle* Nature between the *Human* and the *Divine*. Agreeably to which he here intimates, that to Himſelf was particularly allotted the *Philoſophic* and *Inquiſitive Genius*; That *intermediate* Principle, which in a *Human Way* leads to the Diſcovery of *Truth*.

[104] Meaning his Philoſophic Friends.

[105] See Note [36].

[106] Thoſe, who are acquainted with the Doctrine of *Socrates* and his Diſciples, will eaſily perceive, that the Drift of *Plato* in this Place is to inſinuate to his Readers, how *near* the *Alliance* is, and how *cloſe* the *Connection*, between the *Human* and *Divine* Natures. But we beg Leave to obſerve farther, with what admirable Art and Addreſs ſuch an Inſinuation is introduced, near the Concluſion of this Inquiry concerning the *Beautifull its Self*; as it is deſigned purpoſely to ſhew, how *nearly* Man is *intereſted* in the Inquiry, and *where* it is that he muſt inquire and learn.

return Home, and am entered in, as ſoon as he hears me talking in this Strain, he aſks me, if I am not aſhamed to pronounce, with ſo much Confidence, what Profeſſions and Employments are fine, or beautiful, or becoming; when I have plainly ſhown my ſelf ſo ignorant with regard to Things Beautiful, as not to know wherein the Nature of Beauty conſiſts. — "And how can You judge, ſays He, "Who has ſpoken a beautiful or fine Speech, or done any "thing elſe, in a handſome Manner, and Who not; igno-"rant as you are What the Beautifull and Handſome is? "Such then being the [107] Diſpoſition of your Mind, is it "poſſible that you can think Life more eligible to You "than Death?"—Thus have I had the ill Fortune, as I told you, to ſuffer Obloquy and Reproach from You, to ſuffer Obloquy alſo and Reproach from Him. But perhaps it is neceſſary to endure All This. If I have received Benefit or Improvement from it, there is no Harm done. And, I ſeem to my ſelf, Hippias, improved and benefited by the Converſation of you Both. For the Meaning of the

[107] The Diſpoſition of Mind, here meant by *Socrates*, is that, which is repreſented in this Dialogue under the *Character* of *Hippias*. But in the *Firſt Alcibiades* we are told, in a more plain and open Manner, that 'tis "a Readineſs to decide dogmatically, and pronounce peremptorily, "What is Honeſt or Diſhoneſt, Beautiful or Baſe, Good or Evil; at-"tended with an Ignorance in the Nature of *the Honeſt*, *the Beautifull*, "and *the Good:* and theſe being Things of *higheſt Moment*, a Man "with ſuch a Mind is liable every Inſtant to commit *Capital Errors*, "and to run eagerly into *Extreme Evil.*"

the Proverb, [108] " Things of Beauty are Things of Diffi-
" culty," if I am not miſtaken in my Self, I know.

[108] *Plato* ends this exquiſitely ſubtle Dialogue with pointing out the *Uſe* of it; the Things, to which he here means to apply the Proverb, being *Wiſdom* and *true Virtue*. For theſe, according to his Doctrine in the *Banquet*, are the *Reſult* of That, which he there ſays is ſo arduous to attain, *a thorow and perfect View of* THE SOVEREIGN BEAUTY.

The Reader is deſired to correct the following Errors; and any other, which may have eſcaped our Obſervation:

Page 44. in the Text, Line the laſt, inſtead of *Apemantus* read *Apemantes*.
Page 43. in the Notes, Line 12. inſtead of *were* read *was*.
Page 62. in the Notes, laſt Line but One, read ἀμφίσβιός τις ὢν.
Page 70. in the Note, Line 3. inſtead of *any more*, read *Beauty*.
Page 77. in the Notes, Line 2. blot out *the* before the Word *freeing*.
Page 81. in the Notes, the laſt Word read εἶη.
Page 105. in the Notes, inſtead of 114, read 115.